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Vanderbilt for useful comments. Special thanks are due to Jeff Netter (the editor), Jeff Jaffe, Randy Kroszner, Bob Parrino and an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions, and to Bob Parrino for generously sharing some of his data. Abstract We argue that outsiders are handicapped in CEO successions to strengthen the incentive that the contest to become(More)
We examine how the use of peer groups and competitive benchmarking influence the structure of executive compensation. We find that the practice of competitive benchmarking is pervasive. Moreover, we find that this practice has an effect on all components of pay. In our sample, CEOs whose pay is below the median pay level of CEOs in firms of similar size and(More)
For helpful comments and suggestions, we are grateful to Dog ˘an Tirtirog ˘lu, and to participants in seminars at Otago University, the New Zealand Finance Workshop, and the Southern Finance Association annual meeting. All remaining errors and ambiguities are our responsibility. Abstract We examine the market reaction to announcements of an intention to(More)
for their helpful comments. We would also like to thank the Real Estate Research Institute for funding the project. All remaining errors are our own. Abstract While several studies have documented behavioral biases in the behavior of individual investors, very little is known about the existence of such biases in corporations. We utilize the unique nature(More)
managers is used to examine how executives may use interpersonal influence behavior to prevent powerful institutional investors from using their coercive power to force changes in corporate governance and strategy. We theorize that high levels of institutional ownership may prompt CEOs to engage in interpersonal influence behavior in the form of(More)
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