Steven R. Williams

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R-type pyocins are high-molecular-weight bacteriocins that resemble bacteriophage tail structures and are produced by some Pseudomonas aeruginosa strains. R-type pyocins kill by dissipating the bacterial membrane potential after binding. The high-potency, single-hit bactericidal kinetics of R-type pyocins suggest that they could be effective antimicrobials.(More)
A recent widespread outbreak of Escherichia coli O104:H4 in Germany demonstrates the dynamic nature of emerging and re-emerging food-borne pathogens, particularly STECs and related pathogenic E. coli. Rapid genome sequencing and public availability of these data from the German outbreak strain allowed us to identify an O-antigen-specific bacteriophage tail(More)
DeMarzo, Kremer and Skrzypacz (2005) considers auctions in which bids are selected from a completely ordered family of securities whose ultimate values are tied to the resource being auctioned. The paper defines a notion of relative steepness of families of securities and shows that a steeper family generates a higher expected revenue. Two key assumptions(More)
We consider a market for indivisible items with m buyers, each of whom wishes to buy at most one item, and m sellers, each of whom has one item to sell. The traders privately know their values/costs, which are statistically dependent. Two mechanisms for trading are considered. The buyer's bid double auction collects bids and offers from traders and(More)
We study the problem of selling a resource through an auction mechanism. The winning buyer in turn develops this resource to generate profit. Two forms of payment are considered: charging the winning buyer a one-time payment, or an initial payment plus a profit sharing contract (PSC). We consider a symmetric interdependent values model with risk averse or(More)
Limited observability is the assumption that economic agents can only observe a finite amount of information. Given this constraint, contracts among agents are necessarily finite and incomplete in comparison to the ideal complete contract that we model as infinite in detail. We consider the extent to which finite contracts can approximate the idealized(More)
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