Steven R. Williams

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We consider a single object, independent private value auction model with entry. Potential bidders are ex ante symmetric and randomize about entry. After entry, each bidder incurs a cost, then learns her private value and a set of signals that may lead to updated beliefs about other entrants' valuations. It is shown that the Vickrey auction with free entry(More)
R-type pyocins are high-molecular-weight bacteriocins that resemble bacteriophage tail structures and are produced by some Pseudomonas aeruginosa strains. R-type pyocins kill by dissipating the bacterial membrane potential after binding. The high-potency, single-hit bactericidal kinetics of R-type pyocins suggest that they could be effective antimicrobials.(More)
It is well-known that in two-sided matching markets (with contracts) that the existence of a stable outcome can be guaranteed if and only if agents' preferences are substitutable and contracts are bilateral. We show that, in markets with a continuum of each type of agent, it is only necessary that agents on one side of the market have substitutable(More)
A recent widespread outbreak of Escherichia coli O104:H4 in Germany demonstrates the dynamic nature of emerging and re-emerging food-borne pathogens, particularly STECs and related pathogenic E. coli. Rapid genome sequencing and public availability of these data from the German outbreak strain allowed us to identify an O-antigen-specific bacteriophage tail(More)
We consider a market for indivisible items with m buyers, each of whom wishes to buy at most one item, and m sellers, each of whom has one item to sell. The traders privately know their values/costs, which are statistically dependent. Two mechanisms for trading are considered. The buyer's bid double auction collects bids and offers from traders and(More)
DeMarzo, Kremer and Skrzypacz (2005) considers auctions in which bids are selected from a completely ordered family of securities whose ultimate values are tied to the resource being auctioned. The paper defines a notion of relative steepness of families of securities and shows that a steeper family generates a higher expected revenue. Two key assumptions(More)