Stephanie Wang

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In experiments, people do not always appear to infer the information of other players from their choices. To understand this thinking process further, we use “Mousetracking” to record which game payoffs subjects look at, and for how long, in games of private information with three information states, which vary in strategic complexity. Subjects often(More)
We study the effect of financial resources on decision-making. Low-income U.S. households are randomly assigned to receive an online survey before or after payday. The survey collects measures of cognitive function and administers risk and intertemporal choice tasks. The study design generates variation in cash, checking and savings balances, and(More)
Dynamically optimized sequential experiments (DOSEs) to estimate risk preferences start with a distribution of beliefs about risk preference parameters, and a set of questions, then dynamically choose questions that maximizes information gain considering previous answers. Applying the method to the 10-question set of Holt and Laury (2002) and the(More)
In experiments, people do not always appear to think very strategically or to infer the information of others from their choices. We report experimental results in games of private information with three information states, which vary in strategic complexity. “Mousetracking” is used to record which game payoffs subjects look at, for how long, to learn more(More)
In visual search tasks, if a set of items is presented for 1 s before another set of new items (containing the target) is added, search can be restricted to the new set. The process that eliminates old items from search is visual marking. This study investigates the kind of memory that distinguishes the old items from the new items during search. Using an(More)
Several recent studies in experimental economics have tried to measure beliefs of subjects engaged in strategic games with other subjects. Using data from one such study we conduct an experiment where our experienced subjects observe early rounds of strategy choices from that study and are given monetary incentives to report forecasts of choices in later(More)
We analyze a game of two-sided private information characterized by extreme adverse selection, and study a special case in the laboratory. Each player has a privately known ”strength” and can decide to fight or compromise. If either chooses to fight, there is a conflict; the stronger player receives a high payoff and the weaker player receives a low payoff.(More)
This paper addresses the role of non-binding goals to attenuate time inconsistency. Agents have linear reference-dependent preferences and endogenously set a goal that is the reference point. They face an infinite horizon, optimal stopping problem in continuous time, where there exists an option value of waiting due to uncertainty. Goal-setting attenuates(More)
We investigate whether people predict the biases of others with an experiment that matches agents with informed or uninformed principals. While the agents’ beliefs are well-calibrated regarding the average task performance, they also correctly believe that informed principals monitoring their performance project their information and overestimate the(More)