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In experiments, people do not always appear to infer the information of other players from their choices. To understand this thinking process further, we use " Mousetracking " to record which game payoffs subjects look at, and for how long, in games of private information with three information states, which vary in strategic complexity. Subjects often(More)
In visual search tasks, if a set of items is presented for 1 s before another set of new items (containing the target) is added, search can be restricted to the new set. The process that eliminates old items from search is visual marking. This study investigates the kind of memory that distinguishes the old items from the new items during search. Using an(More)
Several recent studies in experimental economics have tried to measure beliefs of subjects engaged in strategic games with other subjects. Using data from one such study we conduct an experiment where our experienced subjects observe early rounds of strategy choices from that study and are given monetary incentives to report forecasts of choices in later(More)
  • S Nageeb, Ali, Jacob K Goeree, Navin Kartik, Thomas R Palfrey, David Austen-Smith +7 others
  • 2008
In the last decade, Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas de Caritat Marquis de Condorcet's (1785) theory of committee decision making has emerged as a workhorse model in political economy, particularly voting theory. In its simplest modern formulation, the " Condorcet Jury Model " (CJM hereafter) features a committee of size n that is faced with a binary policy. The(More)
In experiments, people do not always appear to think very strategically or to infer the information of others from their choices. We report experimental results in games of private information with three information states, which vary in strategic complexity. " Mousetracking " is used to record which game payoffs subjects look at, for how long, to learn(More)
  • Marco Battaglini, Alfred P Sloan Research, Rebecca Morton Is Professor, We, Anna Bassi, Shivani Nayyar +2 others
  • 2007
W e compare the behavior of voters under simultaneous and sequential voting rules when voting is costly and information is incomplete. In many political institutions, ranging from small committees to mass elections, voting is sequential, which allows some voters to know the choices of earlier voters. For a stylized model, we generate a variety of(More)
  • Dustin H Tingley, Stephanie W Wang, Scott Ashworth, Roland Benabou, Raymond Hicks, Jens Grosser +8 others
  • 2010
We investigate theoretically and experimentally the " crisis bargaining model, " a dynamic game of two-sided incomplete information with player types drawn from a commonly known distribution. Little work has been done to analyze whether and how players update their beliefs in such games. Within the experiment we elicited beliefs from players about their(More)
In this paper, we derive and experimentally test a theoretical model of speculation in multiperiod asset markets with public information flows. The speculation arises from the traders' heterogeneous posteriors as they make different inferences from sequences of public information. This leads to overpricing in the sense that price exceeds the most optimistic(More)
Hindsight bias is the tendency to retrospectively think of outcomes as being more foreseeable than they actually were. It is a robust judgment bias and is difficult to correct (or "debias"). In the experiments reported here, we used a visual paradigm in which performers decided whether blurred photos contained humans. Evaluators, who saw the photos(More)