Steffen Lippert

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a Massey University, School of Economics and Finance (Albany), PB 102 904, North Shore Mail Centre, Auckland 0745, New Zealand b New Zealand Social Innovation and Entrepreneurship Research Centre, New Zealand c Centre for Mathematical Social Sciences, University of Auckland, New Zealand d University of Rome “Tor Vergata”, Department of Economics and(More)
This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price rules of determining the uniform price, we show that when each firm sets a price-quantity pair specifying the firm’s(More)
We model networks of relational (or implicit) contracts, exploring how sanctioning power and equilibrium conditions change under different network configurations and information transmission technologies. In our model, relations are the links, and the value of the network lies in its ability to enforce cooperative agreements that could not be sustained if(More)
In this paper we construct a model in which entrepreneurial innovations are sold into oligopolistic industries and where adverse selection problems between entrepreneurs, venture capitalists and incumbents are present. We show that as exacerbated development by better-informed venture-backed firms is used as a signal to enhance the sale price of developed(More)
a r t i c l e i n f o We consider a simple oligopoly model where firms engage in cost-reducing R&D and compare two R&D regimes: R&D competition and R&D cooperation in the form of a research joint venture (RJV). We introduce coordination costs for the RJV and examine how these affect the equilibrium outcomes. We find that the performance of the RJV in(More)
We build a principal-agent-client model of corruption, allowing for heterogeneity of the value of public projects relative to the cost of monitoring their virtuous execution. In an environment in which potential corruptors face uncertainty about the type of project followed by officials, we show under which conditions officials with low-value projects have(More)
This paper investigates the impact of a 'free drug program' on the market equilibrium of drugs. We introduce a screening model of the hard drug market in which dealers use payment and punishment options to screen between high and low risk users. We show that, if a free drug program selects sufficiently many high-risk drug users, the pure-strategy separating(More)