Stefano V. Albrecht

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The ad hoc coordination problem is to design an autonomous agent which is able to achieve optimal flexibility and efficiency in a multiagent system with no mechanisms for prior coordination. We conceptualise this problem formally using a game-theoretic model, called the stochastic Bayesian game, in which the behaviour of a player is determined by its(More)
This paper is concerned with evaluating different multiagent learning (MAL) algorithms in problems where individual agents may be heterogenous, in the sense of utilizing different learning strategies, without the opportunity for prior agreements or information regarding coordination. Such a situation arises in ad hoc team problems, a model of many practical(More)
There is a long history in game theory on the topic of Bayesian or “rational” learning, in which each player maintains beliefs over a set of alternative behaviours, or types, for the other players. This idea has gained increasing interest in the artificial intelligence (AI) community, where it is used as a method to control a single agent in a system(More)
Many multiagent applications require an agent to learn quickly how to interact with previously unknown other agents. To address this problem, researchers have studied learning algorithms which compute posterior beliefs over a hypothesised set of policies, based on the observed actions of the other agents. The posterior belief is complemented by the prior(More)
This thesis is concerned with the ad hoc coordination problem. Therein, the goal is to design an autonomous agent which can achieve high flexibility and efficiency in a multiagent system that admits no prior coordination between the designed agent and the other agents. Flexibility describes the agent’s ability to solve its task with a variety of other(More)
While many multiagent algorithms are designed for homogeneous systems (i.e. all agents are identical), there are important applications which require an agent to coordinate its actions without knowing a priori how the other agents behave. One method to make this problem feasible is to assume that the other agents draw their latent policy (or type) from a(More)
The key for effective interaction in many multiagent applications is to reason explicitly about the behaviour of other agents, in the form of a hypothesised behaviour. While there exist several methods for the construction of a behavioural hypothesis, there is currently no universal theory which would allow an agent to contemplate the correctness of a(More)
This special issue of the Journal of Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems sought research articles on the emerging topic of multiagent interaction without prior coordination. Topics of interest included empirical and theoretical investigations of issues arising from assumptions of prior coordination, as well as solutions in the form of novel models and(More)
POMDPs are a useful model for decision making in systems with uncertain states. One of the core tasks in a POMDP is the monitoring task, in which the belief state (i.e. the probability distribution over system states) is updated based on incomplete and noisy observations. This can be a hard problem in complex real-world systems due to the often very large(More)
Proof. Kalai and Lehrer [2] studied a model which can be equivalently described as a single-state SBG (i.e. |S| = 1) with a pure type distribution and product posterior. They showed that, if the player’s assessment of future play is absolutely continuous with respect to the true probabilities of future play (i.e. any event that has true positive probability(More)