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We introduce Scantegrity II, a practical enhancement for optical scan voting systems that achieves increased election integrity through the novel use of confirmation codes printed on ballots in invisible ink. Voters mark ballots just as in conventional optical scan but using a special pen that develops the invisible ink. Verifiability of election integrity(More)
Scantegrity is a security enhancement for optical scan voting systems. It's part of an emerging class of "end-to-end" independent election verification systems that permit each voter to verify that his or her ballot was correctly recorded and counted. On the Scantegrity ballot, each candidate position is paired with a random letter. Election officials(More)
On November 3, 2009, voters in Takoma Park, Mary-land, cast ballots for the mayor and city council members using the Scantegrity II voting system—the first time any end-to-end (E2E) voting system with ballot privacy has been used in a binding governmental election. This case study describes the various efforts that went into the election—including the(More)
Scantegrity II is an enhancement for existing paper ballot systems. It allows voters to verify election integrity - from their selections on the ballot all the way to the final tally - by noting codes and checking for them online. Voters mark Scantegrity II ballots just as with conventional optical scan, but using a special ballot marking pen. Marking a(More)
[This page intentionally left blank. ] This document has been prepared by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and describes research in support military and overseas voting for the Election Assistance Commission and the Technical Guidelines Development Committee. It does not represent a consensus view or recommendation from NIST, nor(More)
This paper presents a method for adding end-to-end verifi-ability to any optical-scan vote counting system. A serial number and set of letters, paired with every candidate, are printed on each optical-scan ballot. The letter printed next to the candidate(s) chosen by the voter is posted to a bulletin board, and these letters are used as input to Punchscan's(More)
All voter-verifiable voting schemes in the literature require that the voter be able to see and to mark. This paper describes modifications to the Prêt a ` Voter and PunchScan schemes so that a voter who can either see or hear, or both, independent of marking ability, may avail of voter-verifiability without revealing her vote. The modified systems would(More)
— This paper presents a case study of the E2E voting system Punchscan and its first use in a binding election. The election was held in March 2007 at the University of Ottawa for several offices within the university's graduate student association. This case study presents a walkthrough of the election and offers discussion as to how the voters and poll(More)