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We introduce Scantegrity II, a practical enhancement for optical scan voting systems that achieves increased election integrity through the novel use of confirmation codes printed on ballots in invisible ink. Voters mark ballots just as in conventional optical scan but using a special pen that develops the invisible ink. Verifiability of election integrity(More)
On November 3, 2009, voters in Takoma Park, Mary-land, cast ballots for the mayor and city council members using the Scantegrity II voting system—the first time any end-to-end (E2E) voting system with ballot privacy has been used in a binding governmental election. This case study describes the various efforts that went into the election—including the(More)
—Scantegrity II is an enhancement for existing paper ballot systems. It allows voters to verify election integrity—from their selections on the ballot all the way to the final tally—by noting codes and checking for them online. Voters mark Scant-egrity II ballots just as with conventional optical scan, but using a special ballot marking pen. Marking a(More)
All voter-verifiable voting schemes in the literature require that the voter be able to see and to mark. This paper describes modifications to the Prêt a ` Voter and PunchScan schemes so that a voter who can either see or hear, or both, independent of marking ability, may avail of voter-verifiability without revealing her vote. The modified systems would(More)
We present a new model for polling-booth voting: the voter enters the polling booth with a computational assistant which helps her verify that her vote is correctly recorded. The assistant interacts with the voting system while the voter votes on the machine in the polling booth. We present an independently-verifiable, coercion-resistant protocol based on(More)
We report on our experiences and lessons learned using Scantegrity II in a mock election held April 11, 2009, in Takoma Park, Maryland. Ninety-five members of the community participated in our test of this voting system proposed for the November 2009 municipal election. Results helped improve the system for the November binding election.
The term " end-to-end verifiability " has been used over the past several years to describe multiple voting system proposals. The term has, however, never been formally defined. As a result, its meaning tends to change from voting system to voting system. We propose a definition for end-to-end verifiability of public elections based on performance(More)