This paper is concerned with the minimal number of profiles at which a unanimous and anonymous social choice function is manipulable. The lower bound is derived when there are three alternatives to choose from. Examples of social choice functions attaining the lower bound are given. We conjecture that these examples are in fact all minimally manipulable… (More)
Vx86 is the first static analyzer for sequential Intel x86 as-sembler code using automated deductive verification. It proves the cor-rectness of assembler code against function contracts, which are expressed in terms of pre-, post-, and frame conditions using first-order predicates. Vx86 takes the annotated assembler code, translates it into C code… (More)
We compare the manipulability of different choice rules by considering the number of manipulable profiles. We establish the minimal number of such profiles for tops-only, anonymous, and surjective choice rules, and show that this number is attained by unanimity rules with status quo.
The ocean is an electrically conducting fluid that generates secondary magnetic fields as it flows through Earth's main magnetic field. Extracting ocean flow signals from remote observations has become possible with the current generation of satellites measuring Earth's magnetic field. Here, we consider the magnetic fields generated by the ocean lunar… (More)
The pace of scientific discovery is being transformed by the availability of 'big data' and open access, open source software tools. These innovations open up new avenues for how scientists communicate and share data and ideas with each other and with the general public. Here, we describe our efforts to bring to life our studies of the Earth system, both at… (More)
Gibbard [Gibbard, A., 1973. Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result. Econometrica 41, 587– 602] and Satterthwaite [Satterthwaite, M., 1975. Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions. Journal of Economic Theory 10,187–217] show that an anonymous social choice… (More)