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Leakage-Resilient Cryptography
TLDR
We construct a stream-cipher S whose implementation is secure even if a bounded amount of arbitrary (adversarially chosen) information on the internal state ofS is leaked during computation. Expand
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Secure Multiparty Computations on Bitcoin
TLDR
We show that the Bit coin system provides an attractive way to construct a version of "timed commitments", where the committer has to reveal his secret within a certain time frame, or to pay a fine. Expand
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Proofs of Space
Proofs of work (PoW) have been suggested by Dwork and Naor (Crypto’92) as protection to a shared resource. The basic idea is to ask the service requestor to dedicate some non-trivial amount ofExpand
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Intrusion-Resilience Via the Bounded-Storage Model
TLDR
We introduce a new method of achieving intrusion-resilience in the cryptographic protocols. Expand
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Non-Malleable Codes
We introduce the notion of “non-malleable codes” which relaxes the notion of error correction and error detection. Informally, a code is non-malleable if the message contained in a modified codewordExpand
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Efficient Multiparty Computations Secure Against an Adaptive Adversary
TLDR
We consider verifiable secret sharing (VSS) and multiparty computation (MPC) in the secure-channel model, where a broadcast channel is given and a non-zero error probability is allowed. Expand
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PoW-Based Distributed Cryptography with No Trusted Setup
TLDR
We study the question of constructing distributed cryptographic protocols in a fully peer-to-peer scenario under the assumption that the adversary has limited computing power and there is no trusted setup (like PKI, or an unpredictable beacon). Expand
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Fair Two-Party Computations via Bitcoin Deposits
TLDR
We show how the Bitcoin currency system (with a small modification) can be used to obtain fairness in any two-party secure computation protocol in the following sense: if one party aborts the protocol after learning the output then the other party gets a financial compensation (in bitcoins). Expand
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Leakage-Resilient Cryptography From the Inner-Product Extractor
TLDR
We present a generic method to secure various widely-used cryptosystems against arbitrary side-channel leakage, as long as the leakage adheres three restrictions: first, it is bounded per observation but in total can be arbitrary large. Expand
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Intrusion-Resilient Secret Sharing
TLDR
We introduce a new primitive called intrusion-resilient secret sharing (IRSS), whose security proof exploits the fact that there exist functions which can be efficiently computed interactively using low communication complexity in k, but not in k-1 rounds. Expand
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