Learn More
This paper specifies, via a Hoare-like logic, an interprocedural and flow sensitive (but termination insensitive) information flow analysis for object-oriented programs. Pointer aliasing is ubiquitous in such programs, and can potentially leak confidential information. Thus the logic employs <i>independence assertions</i> to describe the noninterference(More)
SQL injection attacks are one of the topmost threats for applications written for the Web. These attacks are launched through specially crafted user input on web applications that use low level string operations to construct SQL queries. In this work, we exhibit a novel and powerful scheme for automatically transforming web applications to render them safe(More)
The browser has become the de facto platform for everyday computation. Among the many potential attacks that target or exploit browsers, vulnerabilities in browser extensions have received relatively little attention. Currently , extensions are vetted by manual inspection, which does not scale well and is subject to human error. In this paper, we present(More)
Over the years, many aspects of the transfer of information from one party to another have commanded the attention of the security and privacy community. Released information can have various levels of sensitivity: facts that are pub-lic, sensitive private information that requires its original owner's permission for its future dissemination, or even(More)
The browser has become the de facto platform for everyday computation and a popular target for attackers of computer systems. Among the many potential attacks that target or exploit browsers, vulnerabilities in browser extensions have received relatively little attention. Currently, extensions are vetted by manual inspection, which is time consuming and(More)
Early work on security-typed languages required that legal information flows be defined statically. More recently, techniques have been introduced that relax these assumptions and allow policies to change at run-time. For example , the Rx language uses a policy language based on RT, a trust management framework for representing authorization policies. While(More)
—Simple non-interference is too restrictive for specifying and enforcing information flow policies in most programs. Exceptions to non-interference are provided using declassification policies. Several approaches for enforcing declassification have been proposed in the literature. In most of these approaches, the declassification policies are embedded in(More)
Early work on security-typed languages required that legal information flows be defined statically. In recent years, techniques have been introduced that relax these assumptions and allow policies to change at run time. For example, the Rx language [2] uses a policy language based on RT [1], a trust management framework for representing authorization(More)
  • 1