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I design and test a simple English auction and two English auctions with resale, but with di¤erent informational backgrounds. All three treatments theoretically have the same equilibrium. I …nd, however, that the possibility of resale alters behavior signi…cantly. In the two treatments with resale, subjects deviated from both the Nash prediction and the(More)
Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science,(More)
We examine whether the 'Level-k' model of strategic behavior generates reliable cross-game testable predictions at the level of the individual player. Subjects' observed levels are fairly consistent within one family of similar games, but within another family of games there is virtually no cross-game correlation. Moreover, the relative ranking of subjects'(More)
Bidding one's value in a second-price auction with private valuations is a dominant solution (Vickrey, 1961). However, repeated experimental studies …nd much more overbidding than underbidding, resulting in overbidding on average. In our experimental work we introduce manipulations against which the dominant strategy is immune, yet they a¤ect bidding in a(More)
We present results from an experiment based on Hafalir and Krishna's (2008) model of auctions with resale. As predicted weak bidders bid more with resale than without, so that resale raises average auction prices. When the equilibrium calls for weak types to bid higher than their values with resale they do, but not nearly as much as the theory predicts.(More)
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