Sotiris Georganas

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We examine whether the ‘Level-k’ model of strategic behavior generates reliable cross-game testable predictions at the level of the individual player. Subjects’ observed levels are fairly consistent within one family of similar games, but within another family of games there is virtually no cross-game correlation. Moreover, the relative ranking of subjects’(More)
Bidding one’s value in a second-price auction with private valuations is a dominant solution (Vickrey, 1961). However, repeated experimental studies …nd much more overbidding than underbidding, resulting in overbidding on average. In our experimental work we introduce manipulations against which the dominant strategy is immune, yet they a¤ect bidding in a(More)
I design and test a simple English auction and two English auctions with resale, but with different informational backgrounds. All three treatments theoretically have the same equilibrium. I find, however, that the possibility of resale alters behavior significantly. In the two treatments with resale, subjects deviated from both the Nash prediction and the(More)
Peer Pressure and Productivity: The Role of Observing and Being Observed Peer effects arise in situations where workers observe each other’s work activity. In this paper we disentangle the effect of observing a peer from that of being observed by a peer, by setting up a real effort experiment in which we manipulate the observability of performance. In(More)
We investigate whether the perception of economy-wide inflation is affected by the frequency with which various goods' prices are observed. We provide novel experimental evidence that consumers' perceptions of aggregate inflation are systematically biased toward the perceived inflation rates of the frequently purchased items. This ‘frequency bias’ may(More)
We present results from an experiment based on Hafalir and Krishna’s (2008) model of auctions with resale. As predicted weak bidders bid more with resale than without, so that resale raises average auction prices. When the equilibrium calls for weak types to bid higher than their values with resale they do, but not nearly as much as the theory predicts.(More)
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