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- Sophie Bade
- Games and Economic Behavior
- 2011

A game-theoretic framework that allows for explicitly randomized strategies is used to study the effect of ambiguity aversion on equilibrium outcomes. The notions of “independent strategies” as well… (More)

- Sophie Bade, Guillaume Haeringer, Ludovic Renou
- J. Economic Theory
- 2007

In this paper, we isolate a non-trivial class of games for which there exists a monotone relation between the size of strategy spaces and the number of Nash equilibria. This class is that of… (More)

- Sophie Bade
- 2014

Fix a Pareto optimal, strategy proof and non-bossy deterministic matching mechanism and define a random matching mechanism by assigning agents to the roles in the mechanism via a uniform lottery.… (More)

- Sophie Bade
- 2012

The study of matching problems typically assumes that agents precisely know their preferences over the goods to be assigned. Within applied contexts, this assumption stands out as particularly… (More)

The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem [Gibbard, 1973, Satterthwaite, 1975] holds that dictatorship is the only Pareto optimal and strategyproof social choice function on the full domain of… (More)

- Sophie Bade
- Social Choice and Welfare
- 2014

A version of the Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics that applies to a money-free environment, in which a set of indivisible goods needs to be matched to some set of agents, is… (More)

- Sophie Bade
- Games and Economic Behavior
- 2011

The nonexistence of equilibria in models of electoral competition involving multiple issues is one of the more puzzling results in political economics. In this paper, we relax the standard assumption… (More)

- Sophie Bade, Guillaume Haeringer, Ludovic Renou
- J. Economic Theory
- 2009

We consider non-cooperative environments in which two players have the power to commit but cannot sign binding agreements. We show that by committing to a set of actions rather than to a single… (More)

- Sophie Bade
- J. Economic Theory
- 2015

In random incentive mechanisms agents choose from multiple problems and a randomization device selects a single problem to determine payment. Agents are assumed to act as if they faced each problem… (More)

- Sophie Bade
- 2014

The set of all Pareto optimal, strategy proof and non-bossy mechanisms is characterized as the set of trading and braiding mechanisms. Fix a matching problem with more than three houses and a profile… (More)