Sonja Brangewitz

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We investigate the relationship between the inner core and asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions for n-person bargaining games with complete information. We show that the set of asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions for different strictly positive weights coincides with the inner core if all points in the underlying bargaining set are strictly positive.(More)
This paper analyzes the stability of capital tax harmonization agreements in a stylized model where countries have formed coalitions which set a common tax rate in order to avoid the inefficient fully non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. In particular, for a given coalition structure we study to what extend the stability of tax agreements is affected by the(More)
This paper explores how cloud provider competition influences instance pricing in an IaaS (Infrastructure-as-a-Service) market. When reserved instance pricing includes an on-demand price component in addition to a reservation fee (two-part tariffs), different providers might offer different price combinations, where the client's choice depends on its load(More)
In this paper, we analyze a model in which two divisions negotiate over an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Formally, we consider bargaining problems under incomplete information, since the upstream division's (seller's) costs and downstream division's (buyer's) revenues are supposed to be private information. Assuming two possible(More)
We study the consequences of dropping the perfect competition assumption in a standard infinite horizon model with infinitely-lived traders and real collateralized assets , together with one additional ingredient: information among players is asymmetric and monitoring is incomplete. The key insight is that trading assets is not only a way to hedge oneself(More)
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