Siwan Anderson

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This paper investigates individual motives to participate in rotating savings and credit associations (roscas). Detailed evidence from roscas in a Kenyan slum (Nairobi) suggests that most roscas are predominantly composed of women, particularly those living in a couple and earning an independent income. We propose an explanation of this based on conictual(More)
It is the most cruel mockery to tell a man he may vote for A or B, when you know that he is so much under the influence of A, or the friends of A, that his voting for B would be attended with the destruction of him. It is not he who has the vote, really and substantially , but his landlord, for it is for his benefit and interest that it is exercised in the(More)
Amongst the various inequities typically associated with the caste system in India, probably one of the most debilitating is the perception that one is doomed by birth, i.e., social and economic mobility across generations is di¢ cult. We study the extent and evolution of this lack of mobility by contrasting the intergenerational mobility rates of the(More)
In contrast to most dowry-oriented societies in which payments have declined with modernization, those in India have undergone significant inflation over the last five decades. This paper explains the difference between these two experiences by focusing on the role played by caste. The theoretical model contrasts caste-and non-caste-based societies: in the(More)
This paper uses exogenous variation in electoral rules to test the predictions of strategic voting models and the causal validity of Duverger's Law. Exploiting a regression discontinuity design in the assignment of single-ballot and dual-ballot (runoff) plurality systems in Brazilian mayoral races, the results indicate that single-ballot plurality rule(More)
This paper proposes that major determinants of allocation of women's time are social norms that regulate the economic activities of women. Our emphasis on norms contrasts with approaches that view time allocation as determined by household-level economic variables. Using data from Burkina Faso, we show that social norms significantly explain differences in(More)
This paper analyzes the dynamic interaction between norms — internalized restraints on opportunistic behavior — and institutions — restraints on such behavior deriving from external enforcement. When individuals following a norm suffer pecuniary losses to doing so, the norm is eroded. Institutions, on the other hand, are strengthened when institution(More)
We develop a simple competitive model of the marriage market in which bridal families decide how much to transfer to their daughter and how much to transfer to a potential groom. By allocating property rights over total marital transfers in this way, the bridal family influences the outcome of intra-household bargaining. This approach formalizes and(More)
In many developing countries, institutional setups often feature a key group of players, the elite, seeking to manipulate extant institutions to their advantage. Their means of doing this vary across contexts and matter greatly for optimal institutional design and reform. We explore this process for village level governing institutions in India, using a(More)