Learn More
It is well known that strategic behavior in elections is essentially unavoidable; we therefore ask: how bad can the rational outcome be? We answer this question via the notion of the price of anarchy, using the scores of alternatives as a proxy for their quality and bounding the ratio between the score of the optimal alternative and the score of the winning(More)
In this paper we introduce and analyze social distance games, a family of non-transferable utility coalitional games where an agent's utility is a measure of closeness to the other members of the coalition. We study both social welfare maximi-sation and stability in these games from a graph theoretic perspective. We investigate the welfare of stable(More)
The Fisher market model is one of the most fundamental resource allocation models in economics. In a Fisher market, the prices and allocations of goods are determined according to the preferences and budgets of buyers to clear the market. In a Fisher market game, however, buyers are strategic and report their preferences over goods; the market-clearing(More)
We present and analyze coalitional affinity games, a family of hedonic games that explicitly model the value that an agent receives from being associated with other agents. We provide a characterization of the social-welfare maximizing coalition structures, and study the stability properties of affinity games, using the core solution concept. Interestingly(More)
" A pessimist sees the difficulty in every opportunity; an optimist sees the opportunity in every difficulty. " ABSTRACT Two-sided matchings are an important theoretical tool used to model markets and social interactions. In many real-life problems the utility of an agent is influenced not only by their own choices, but also by the choices that other agents(More)
We introduce the simultaneous model for cake cutting (the fair allocation of a divisible good), in which agents simultaneously send messages containing a sketch of their preferences over the cake. We show that this model enables the computation of divisions that satisfy proportionality — a popular fairness notion — using a protocol that circumvents a(More)