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Modern chip multiprocessors (CMPs) are designed to exploit both instruction-level parallelism (ILP) within pro- cessors and thread-level parallelism (TLP) within and across processors. However, the number of processors and the granularity of each processor are fixed at de- sign time. This paper evaluates a flexible architectural approach, called Composable(More)
The proliferation of computers in any domain is followed by the proliferation of malware in that domain. Systems, including the latest mobile platforms, are laden with viruses, rootkits, spyware, adware and other classes of malware. Despite the existence of anti-virus software, malware threats persist and are growing as there exist a myriad of ways to(More)
Growing on-chip wire delays will cause many future microarchitectures to be distributed, in which hardware resources within a single processor become nodes on one or more switched micronetworks. Since large processor cores will require multiple clock cycles to traverse, control must be distributed, not centralized. This paper describes the control protocols(More)
This paper defines and describes a fully distributed implementation of Google's highly effective Pagerank algorithm , for " peer to peer " (P2P) systems. The implementation is based on chaotic (asynchronous) iterative solution of linear systems. The P2P implementation also enables incre-mental computation of pageranks as new documents are entered into or(More)
—Hardware components can contain hidden back-doors, which can be enabled with catastrophic effects or for ill-gotten profit. These backdoors can be inserted by a malicious insider on the design team or a third-party IP provider. In this paper, we propose techniques that allow us to build trustworthy hardware systems from components designed by untrusted(More)
On-chip performance counters play a vital role in computer architecture research due to their ability to quickly provide insights into application behaviors that are time consuming to characterize with traditional methods. The usefulness of modern performance counters, however, is limited by inefficient techniques used today to access them. Current access(More)
We present a micro-architectural side-channel attack that runs entirely in the browser. In contrast to previous work in this genre, our attack does not require the attacker to install software on the victim's machine; to facilitate the attack, the victim needs only to browse to an untrusted webpage that contains attacker-controlled content. This makes our(More)
Hardware design today bears similarities to software design. Often vendors buy and integrate code acquired from third-party organizations into their designs, especially in embedded/system-on-chip designs. Currently, there is no way to determine if third-party designs have built-in backdoors that can compromise security after deployment. The key observation(More)
There have been many attacks that exploit side-effects of program execution to expose secret information and many proposed countermeasures to protect against these attacks. However there is currently no systematic, holistic methodology for understanding information leakage. As a result, it is not well known how design decisions affect information leakage or(More)
Over the past two decades, several microarchitectural side channels have been exploited to create sophisticated security attacks. Solutions to this problem have mainly focused on fixing the source of leaks either by limiting the flow of information through the side channel by modifying hardware, or by refactoring vulnerable software to protect sensitive(More)