Silvana Krasteva

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We present a theory of charitable fund-raising in which it is costly to solicit donors. We fully characterize the solicitation strategy that maximizes donations net of fund-raising costs. It is optimal for the fund-raiser to target only the " net contributors " – donors who would give more than their solicitation costs. We show that as the income inequality(More)
The preference between public and private negotiations for a buyer who sequentially visits two suppliers is examined. It is shown that the buyer weakly prefers to conduct private negotiations in order to create strategic uncertainty about the trade history. With substitute goods, such uncertainty is valuable only when price offers have short expiries that(More)
This paper investigates the sequencing choice of a buyer who negotiates with the sellers of two complementary objects with uncertain payoffs. We show that the buyer cares about the sequence only when equilibrium trade can be inefficient. In this case, the buyer begins with the weaker seller if the sellers have diverse bargaining powers. If, however, both(More)
This paper uses high-frequency S&P 500 index futures data and data on the VIX index to provide an arbitrage-free explanation of the variance risk premium and its dynamics. Using the high-frequency data only, I select a semiparametric two-factor stochastic volatility model, containing jumps in the price and the stochastic variance. For this model I derive(More)
We propose a model of charity competition in which informed giving alone can explain quality heterogeneity across similar charities. It is this heterogeneity that also creates the demand for information. In equilibrium, too few donors pay to be informed; but interestingly, informed giving may increase with the cost of information. This is true if the(More)
Recent theoretical research indicates that search deterrence strategies are generally optimal for sellers in consumer goods markets. Yet search deterrence is not always employed in such markets. To understand this incongruity, we develop an experimental market where profit-maximizing strategy dictates sellers should exercise one form of search deterrence,(More)
An advocate for a special interest provides information to an uninformed planner for her to consider in making a sequence of important decisions. Although the advocate may have valuable information for the planner, it is is also known that the advocate is biased and will distort his advice if necessary to in ‡uence the planner's decision. Each time she(More)
This paper studies a collective decision problem in which a group of individuals with interdependent preferences vote whether or not to implement a public project of unknown value. A utilitarian social planner aggregates these votes according to a majority rule; but, unlike what is commonly assumed in the literature, the planner is unable to commit to the(More)
The preference between public and private negotiations for a buyer who sequentially visits two suppliers is examined. It is shown that the buyer weakly prefers to conduct private negotiations in order to create strategic uncertainty about the trade history. With substitute goods, such uncertainty is valuable only when price offers have short expiries that(More)
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