Shweta Shinde

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Model counting is the problem of determining the number of solutions that satisfy a given set of constraints. Model counting has numerous applications in the quantitative analyses of program execution time, information flow, combinatorial circuit designs as well as probabilistic reasoning. We present a new approach to model counting for structured data(More)
New hardware primitives such as Intel SGX secure a user-level process in presence of an untrusted or compromised OS. Such "enclaved execution" systems are vulnerable to several side-channels, one of which is the page fault channel. In this paper, we show that the page fault side-channel has sufficient channel capacity to extract bits of encryption keys from(More)
New hardware primitives such as Intel SGX have emerged which secure a user-level process in presence of an untrusted OS. Such "enclaved execution" systems are vulnerable to several side-channels, one of which is the page fault channel. In this paper, we study the cryptographic routines from OpenSSL and Libgcrypt and measure the channel capacity in the(More)
As control-flow hijacking defenses gain adoption, it is important to understand the remaining capabilities of adversaries via memory exploits. Non-control data exploits are used to mount information leakage attacks or privilege escalation attacks program memory. Compared to control-flow hijacking attacks, such non-control data exploits have limited(More)
Intel SGX, a new security capability in emerging CPUs, allows user-level application code to execute in hardwareisolated enclaves. Enclave memory is isolated from all other software on the system, even from the privileged OS or hypervisor. While being a promising hardware-rooted building block, enclaves have severely limited capabilities, such as no native(More)
Web servers are vulnerable to a large class of attacks which can allow network attacker to steal sensitive web content. In this work, we investigate the feasibility of a web server architecture, wherein the vulnerable server VM runs on a trusted cloud. All sensitive web content is made available to the vulnerable server VM in encrypted form, thereby(More)
Secure execution of applications on untrusted operating systems is a fundamental security primitive that has been challenging to achieve. In this paper, we propose a new architecture feature called PODARCH, which makes it easy to import executables on an OS without risking the target system’s security or the execution of the imported application. PODARCH(More)
DOM-based cross-site scripting (XSS) is a client-side code injection vulnerability that results from unsafe dynamic code generation in JavaScript applications, and has few known practical defenses. We study dynamic code evaluation practices on nearly a quarter million URLs crawled starting from the the Alexa Top 1000 websites. Of 777,082 cases of dynamic(More)
DOM-based cross-site scripting (XSS) is a client-side vulnerability that pervades JavaScript applications on the web, and has few known practical defenses. In this paper, we introduce DEXTERJS, a testing platform for detecting and validating DOM-based XSS vulnerabilities on web applications. DEXTERJS leverages source-to source rewriting to carry out(More)
As with the Internet, on-demand applications have grown so ubiquitous that almost every business user interacts with at least one, whether it's an email service, a Web conferencing application, or a sales system . This model is already quite common for consumer apps like email and photo sharing, and for certain business applications, like customer(More)