#### Filter Results:

- Full text PDF available (17)

#### Publication Year

2012

2018

- This year (6)
- Last 5 years (18)
- Last 10 years (19)

#### Publication Type

#### Co-author

#### Journals and Conferences

Learn More

- Elliot Anshelevich, Shreyas Sekar
- AAAI
- 2016

We study the Maximum Weighted Matching problem in a partial information setting where the agentsâ€™ utilities for being matched to other agents are hidden and the mechanism only has access to ordinal preference information. Our model is motivated by the fact that in many settings, agents cannot express the numerical values of their utility for differentâ€¦ (More)

- Elliot Anshelevich, Shreyas Sekar
- WINE
- 2016

We study truthful mechanisms for matching and related problems in a partial information setting, where the agentsâ€™ true utilities are hidden, and the algorithm only has access to ordinal preference information. Our model is motivated by the fact that in many settings, agents cannot express the numerical values of their utility for different outcomes, butâ€¦ (More)

- Elliot Anshelevich, Shreyas Sekar
- AAAI
- 2014

We study techniques to incentivize self-interested agents to form socially desirable solutions in scenarios where they benefit from mutual coordination. Towards this end, we consider coordination games where agents have different intrinsic preferences but they stand to gain if others choose the same strategy as them. For non-trivial versions of our game,â€¦ (More)

- Elliot Anshelevich, Shreyas Sekar
- WINE
- 2015

We study the efficiency of allocations in large markets with a network structure where every seller owns an edge in a graph and every buyer desires a path connecting some nodes. While it is known that stable allocations can be very inefficient, the exact properties of equilibria in markets with multiple sellers are not fully understood, even in singlesourceâ€¦ (More)

- Shreyas Sekar, Sujoy Sikdar, Lirong Xia
- AAMAS
- 2017

We study the problem of computing optimal bundles given agentsâ€™ preferences over individual items when agents derive satisfaction from the entire bundle under constraints on the size k of the bundle. Building on the notion of Condorcet winning sets by Gehrlein [16], we extend common Condorcet consistent voting rules from the single winner voting setting toâ€¦ (More)

- Elliot Anshelevich, Shreyas Sekar
- ArXiv
- 2015

We study Matching, Clustering, and related problems in a partial information setting, where the agentsâ€™ true utilities are hidden, and the algorithm only has access to ordinal preference information. Our model is motivated by the fact that in many settings, agents cannot express the numerical values of their utility for different outcomes, but are stillâ€¦ (More)

- Elliot Anshelevich, Koushik Kar, Shreyas Sekar
- WINE
- 2016

We study large markets with a single seller which can produce many types of goods, and many multi-minded buyers. The seller chooses posted prices for its many items, and the buyers purchase bundles to maximize their utility. For this setting, we consider the following questions: What fraction of the optimum social welfare does a revenue maximizing solutionâ€¦ (More)

- Elliot Anshelevich, Shreyas Sekar
- EC
- 2017

We study approximation algorithms for revenue maximization based on static <i>item pricing</i>, where a seller chooses prices for various goods in the market, and then the buyers purchase utility-maximizing bundles at these given prices. We formulate two somewhat general techniques for designing good pricing algorithms for this setting: <i>Priceâ€¦ (More)

- V. R. Vijaykumar, Shreyas Sekar, S. Elango, Sainandan Ramakrishnan
- IEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics
- 2018

In wireless communication, secure transmission and reception of data are the major concern today. In recent years, Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) has played a vital role in the security system for secured data communication. The main challenge in RFID-based security system is to design a more secure, better area and power efficient encoderâ€¦ (More)

- Shreyas Sekar, Milan Vojnovic, SeYoung Yun
- ArXiv
- 2016

We consider the closely related problems of maximizing a submodular function subject to a cardinality constraint and that of maximizing the sum of submodular functions subject to a partition matroid contraint. Motivated by applications in team selection, we focus on settings where the function(s) can be expressed as the expected value of a symmetricâ€¦ (More)