I study a symmetric first-price auction prior to which one designated player can offer his rival a bribe in exchange for the latterâ€™s departure from the auction. I consider Essentially Prefectâ€¦ (More)

I study collusion between two bidders in a general symmetric IPV repeated auction, without communication, side transfers, or public randomization. I construct a collusive scheme, endogenous bidâ€¦ (More)

I study games with countably many players, each of whom has finitely many pure strategies. The following are constructed: (i) a game that has a strong equilibrium for all > 0 but does not have a Nashâ€¦ (More)

We incorporate repeated interaction and limits on the number of simultaneous negotiations by the same insurer into the standard multi-lateral insurerhospital Nash-In-Nash (NiN) bargaining model. Thisâ€¦ (More)

I characterize the proportional N -person bargaining solutions by individual rationality, translation invariance, feasible set continuity, and a new axiomâ€” interim improvement. The latter says thatâ€¦ (More)

A bargaining solution balances fairness and efficiency if each playerâ€™s payoff lies between the minimum and maximum of the payoffs assigned to him by the egalitarian and utilitarian solutions. In theâ€¦ (More)

In light of research indicating that individual behavior may violate standard rationality assumptions, we introduce a model of preference aggregation in which neither individual nor collectiveâ€¦ (More)

I study a 2-bidder infinitely repeated IPV first-price auction without transfers, communication, or public randomization, where each bidderâ€™s valuation can assume, in each of the (statisticallyâ€¦ (More)

A bargaining solution guarantees minimal equity if each playerâ€™s payoff is at least as large as the minimum of the payoffs assigned to him by the equal-gain (i.e., egalitarian) and equal-lossâ€¦ (More)