Shino Takayama

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We study price formation in securities markets, using the sequential trade framework of Glosten and Milgrom (1985). This paper makes one basic methodological advance over previous research on sequential securities trading: we allow traders to choose from n trade sizes in a multi-period market, where n can be arbitrarily large. We examine how trade size(More)
Penetration of the Internet has paved the way for the interactive video communication at home. Videos, which subjectively show entire views and give comprehensive overviews at a glance, serve as storable media and information contained in such excellently informative media has been increasingly stored as video image databases. Nevertheless, videos also have(More)
This paper introduces aims, roles, structures, activities and topics/viewpoints of two kinds of IMEKO (International Measurement Confederation) Technical Committees concerning to Measurement Education (TCI) and Measurement Science (TC7), promotes many scientists and engineers to participate in their events, and presents chances to know and exchange new(More)
The dynamic version of the Glosten and Milgrom (1985) model of asset pricing with asymmetric information is studied. It is shown that there is a unique equilibrium when the next-period value function of the informed trader, who knows the terminal value of the asset, is strictly convex and strictly monotone in terms of the market maker’s prior belief. A(More)
Mexico has experienced widespread economic reform in the last two decades. From being a protectionist economy with a policy of import substitution, it has turned into an exportoriented open economy. Why was protectionism a stable policy, and how was it overturned by a reform that went against entrenched interests? I apply a game theoretic model of political(More)
This paper extends the Glosten and Milgrom (1985) model of asset pricing with asymmetric information into a dynamic setting and presents a model of market price manipulation. The paper shows that there is a unique equilibrium and characterizes the equilibrium. It is shown that the nextperiod value function of the informed trader, who knows the terminal(More)
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