Shantanu Biswas

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Numerous algorithms and tools have been deployed in supply chain modeling and problem solving. These are based on stochastic models, mathematical programming models, heuristic techniques, and simulation. Since different decision problems in supply chains entail different approaches to be used for modeling and problem solving, there is a need for a unified(More)
The combinatorial auction problem can be modeled as a weighted set packing problem. Similarly the reverse combinatorial auction can be modeled as a weighted set covering problem. We use the set packing and set covering formulations to suggest novel iterative Dutch auction algorithms for combinatorial auction problems. We use generalized Vickrey auctions(More)
Use of renewable energy sources for electricity generation is gaining prominence due to the increasing importance of sustainable development. Many of the electricity producers using renewable energy resources have very small generating capacities and it is a challenge to integrate them with the grid. Smart grids can play an important role in facilitating(More)
Combinatorial exchanges are double sided marketplaceswith multiple sellers and multiple buyers trading with thehelp of combinatorial bids. The allocation and other associated problems in such exchanges are known to be among the hardest to solve among all economic mechanisms. In this paper, we develop computationally efficient iterative auction mechanisms(More)
The micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSME) sector is one of the fastest growing industrial sectors all over the world. Clusters of small and medium enterprises have been very successful worldwide in promoting their growth. The contributions of MSME clusters to Indian economy in terms of increasing manufacturing capacities, increasing exports,(More)
Auction based mechanisms have become popular in industrial procurement settings. These mechanisms minimize the cost of procurement and at the same time achieve desirable properties such as truthful bidding by the suppliers. In this paper, we investigate the design of truthful procurement auctions taking into account an additional important issue namely(More)
We present an optimal combinatorial auction mechanism for the initial commitment decision problem (ICDP) in virtual organizations for rational agents. ICDP determines how a virtual organization (VO) planner can allocate tasks to supplier agents forming a virtual organization. We take into consideration the reputation of agents in the auction formulation.(More)