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This paper characterizes the revenue maximizing allocation mechanism for a risk neutral seller that owns N, possibly heterogeneous, objects and faces I risk neutral buyers. Buyers' payoffs depend on the entire allocation of objects, on their type, and on the types of all other buyers. Types are independently distributed. The formulation allows for(More)
Secure computation essentially guarantees that whatever computation n players can do with the help of a trusted party, they can also do by themselves. Fundamentally, however, this notion depends on the honesty of at least some players. We put forward and implement a stronger notion, rational secure computation, that does not depend on player honesty, but(More)
and seminar participants at several marketing departments around the country, where I presented an early version of this paper in 2002. Brief abstract At Internet auction sites like eBay, nearly identical goods are often sold in a sequence of auctions, separated by small amounts of time. Upcoming auctions are announced several days in advance, so buyers can(More)
We put forward the notion of a verifiably secure device, in essence a stronger notion of secure computation, and achieve it in the ballot-box model. Verifiably secure devices 1. Provide a perfect solution to the problem of achieving correlated equilibrium, an important and extensively investigated problem at the intersection of game theory, cryptography and(More)
Privacy and trust affect our strategic thinking, yet they have not been precisely modeled in mechanism design. In settings of incomplete information, traditional implementations of a normal-form mechanism —by disregarding the players' privacy, or assuming trust in a mediator— may fail to reach the mechanism's objectives. We thus investigate implementations(More)
A single object is for sale to N asymmetric buyers in the independent private values setting by means of an English auction. We consider implications of seller's active participation in the bidding process, or shill bidding. The main result is that there exists an equilibrium of the English auction with shill bidding that is outcome equivalent to the(More)
Achieving correlated equilibrium is an important and extensively investigated problem at the intersection of many fields: in particular, game theory, cryptography and efficient algorithms. Thus far, however, perfectly rational solutions have been lacking, and the problem has been formulated with somewhat limited objectives. In this paper, we • Provide a(More)