Seok-ju Cho

Publications10
h-index6
Citations179
Highly Influential Citations18
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Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining
Bargaining foundations of the median voter theorem
Credibility, preferences, and bilateral investment treaties
When is a commitment mechanism employed as a solution to a time-inconsistency problem? This article provides a nuanced answer to this question by studying bilateral investment treaties (BITs). We…
Three-party competition in parliamentary democracy with proportional representation
This article studies the long-run dynamics of policy choices, government formations, and voting behavior under a parliamentary constitution and proportional representation. I develop an infinite…
Voting Equilibria Under Proportional Representation
  • Seok-ju Cho
  • Economics
    American Political Science Review
  • 28 April 2014
This article studies the consequences of strategic voting by outcome-oriented voters in elections under proportional representation (PR). I develop a model of elections under PR, in which voters…
Open primaries and crossover voting
We examine strategic voting in open primary elections by developing a Poisson voting game. In the model, two parties simultaneously hold primary elections, with two candidates competing in each…
Retrospective Voting and Political Representation
This article develops a theoretical model of political representation under the single-member district system. I establish the existence of equilibria in which legislative voting of each legislator…
Voting Equilibria Under Proportional Representation Online
Proof of Lemma 1 Let vt = i. Take any j ∈ L and consider profile (j, v−t). Since t is neither majority-pivotal nor median pivotal, k(j, v−t) = k(v), and, thus, ph(j, v−t) = ph(v) for every h ∈ L.…
A Study on the Changes of the Expense Behavior of Insurance Company and Difference by Classification of Insurance Industry
A folk theorem for the one-dimensional spatial bargaining model
TLDR
It is shown that in the one-dimensional bargaining model based on the protocol of Baron and Ferejohn, if voting is simultaneous, publicly observed, and no agent has the power to unilaterally impose a choice, then arbitrary policies can be supported by subgame perfect equilibria in stage-undominated voting strategies when agents are patient.