Sebastian Kranz

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In this paper, we study infinitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring and the possibility of monetary transfers. We develop an efficient algorithm to compute the set of pure strategy public perfect equilibrium payoffs for each discount factor. We also show how all equilibrium payoffs can be implemented with a simple class of stationary(More)
Temptation and self-control have received substantial attention in the theoretical economics literature. Recently, Fudenberg and Levine (2012) modeled behavior when a temptation is " persistent ". This type of temptation is ubiquitous, as it refers to any temptation that is present until one either gives in or makes a costly commitment decision to have it(More)
This paper studies discounted stochastic games perfect or imperfect public monitoring and the opportunity to conduct voluntary monetary transfers. We show that for all discount factors every public perfect equilibrium payoff can be implemented with a simple class of equilibria that have a stationary structure on the equilibrium path and optimal penal codes(More)
We propose a unified framework to study relational contracting and holdup problems in infinite horizon stochastic games. We first illustrate that with respect to long run decisions, the common formulation of rela-tional contracts as Pareto-optimal public perfect equilibria is in stark contrast to fundamental assumptions of holdup models. We develop a model(More)
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