Sebastian Kranz

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We study an industry in which an upstream monopolist supplies an essential input at a regulated price to several downstream …rms. Legal unbundling means that a downstream …rm owns the upstream …rm, but this upstream …rm is legally independent and maximizes its own upstream pro…ts. We allow for non-tari¤ discrimination by the upstream …rm and show that under(More)
We consider a situation where an agent’s effort is monitored by a supervisor who cares for the agent’s well–being. This is modeled by incorporating the agent’s utility into the utility function of the supervisor. The first–best solution can be implemented even if the supervisor’s preferences are unknown. The corresponding optimal contract is similar to what(More)
We study an industry with a monopolistic bottleneck (e.g. a transmission network) supplying an essential input to several downstream …rms. Under legal unbundling the bottleneck must be operated by a legally independent upstream …rm, which may be partly or fully owned by an incumbent active in downstream markets. Access prices are regulated but the upstream(More)
ing from integer-programming problems, it is optimal for the principal to order the signals according to their relative informativeness (likelihood ratio). Put differently, the agent receives the bonus for all signals that are more indicative of high effort than a cutoff signal, e.g., a salesperson receiving a bonus for meeting or exceeding the annual sales(More)
This paper analyses competition of moral norms and institutions in a society where a fixed share of people unconditionally complies with norms and the remaining people act selfishly. Whether a person is a norm-complier or selfish is private knowledge. A model of voting-by-feet shows that those norms and institutions arise that maximize expected utility of(More)
This paper experimentally studies persuasion effects in ultimatum games and finds that Proposers' payoffs significantly increase if, along with offers, they can send messages which Responders read before their acceptance decision. Higher payoffs are due to higher acceptance rates as well as more aggressive offers by Proposers. JEL Classification: C72, C91,(More)
Information, Uncertainty, and Subjective Entitlements in Bargaining More often than not production processes are the joint endeavor of people having different abilities and productivities. Such production processes and the associated surplus production are often not fully transparent in the sense that the relative contributions of involved agents are(More)