Sascha Füllbrunn

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BACKGROUND Employment disparities are known to exist between lean and corpulent people, for example, corpulent people are less likely to be hired and get lower wages. The reasons for these disparities between weight groups are not completely understood. We hypothesize (i) that economic decision making differs between lean and corpulent subjects, (ii) that(More)
We introduce the speculation elicitation task (SET) to measure speculative tendencies of individuals. The resulting SET-score allows us to investigate the role of individual speculative behavior on experimental asset market bubbles. The experimental results show that overpricing in asset markets composed of subjects with a high propensity to speculate (high(More)
The underpricing of initial public offerings is a well-documented fact of empirical equity market research. Theories explain this underpricing with market imperfections. We study three empirically relevant IPO mechanisms under almost perfect market conditions in the laboratory: a stylized book building approach, a closed book auction, and an open book(More)
Decision makers often take risky decisions on behalf of others rather than for themselves. Competing theoretical models predict both; higher as well as lower levels of risk aversion when taking risk for others, and the experimental evidence is mixed. In our comprehensive within-subject design, student subjects in the role of money managers have substantial(More)
This paper experimentally studies the disposition effects of teams and individuals. The disposition effect describes the phenomenon that investors are reluctant to realize losses, whereas winners are sold too early. Our experiments compare the investments of two-person teams to a setting where investors trade alone. We find that subjects investing jointly(More)
In simultaneous ascending price auctions with heterogeneous goods Brusco and Lopomo [2002] derive collusive equilibria, where bidders divide objects among themselves, while keeping the prices low. Considering a simultaneous ascending price auction with a fixed deadline, i.e. the hard close auction format, a prisoner’s dilemma situation results and collusive(More)
Bidding above the risk-neutral Nash Equilibrium in rst price sealed bid auctions has traditionally been ascribed to risk aversion. Recent studies, however, o er other explanations and argue that risk aversion plays no or only a minor role. So far, no study has shown a causal relationship between risk aversion and overbidding. We implement a new experimental(More)
In simultaneous ascending price auctions with heterogeneous goods Brusco and Lopomo (2002) derive collusive equilibria where bidders divide objects among themselves, while keeping the prices low. Considering a simultaneous ascending price auction with a fixed deadline, i.e. the Hard Close auction format, a prisoner’s dilemma situation results and collusive(More)
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