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A Deeper Look at the “Neural Correlate of Consciousness”
A main goal of the neuroscience of consciousness is: find the neural correlate to conscious experiences (NCC). When have we achieved this goal? The answer depends on our operationalization of “NCC.”Expand
Look who's talking! Varieties of ego-dissolution without paradox
How to model non-egoic experiences – mental events with phenomenal aspects that lack a felt self – has become an interesting research question. The main source of evidence for the existence of suchExpand
A double anniversary for the neural correlates of consciousness: Editorial introduction
At the heart of the contemporary science of consciousness is the search for neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs). NCCs and the research programme associated with it rose to prominence 30 yearsExpand
Phenomenal precision and some possible pitfalls : a commentary on Ned Block
Ground Representationism is the position that for each phenomenal feature there is a representational feature that accounts for it. Against this thesis, Ned Block has provided an intricate argumentExpand
Introspective disputes deflated: the case for phenomenal variation
AbstractSceptics vis-à-vis introspection often base their scepticism on ‘phenomenological disputes’, ‘introspective disagreement’, or ‘introspective disputes’ (ID) (see Kriegel in Phenomenol Cogn SciExpand
Phenomenal Precision and Some Possible Pitfalls
Ground Representationism is the position that for each phenomenal feature there is a representational feature that accounts for it. Against this thesis, Ned Block has provided an intricate argumentExpand
Commentary: The Concept of a Bewusstseinskultur
1 Program for Philosophy-Neurosciences-Cognition, Institute III: Philosophy, Otto-von-Guericke-University Magdeburg, Magdeburg, Germany, Center for Behavioral Brain Sciences, Magdeburg, Germany, DFGExpand
Solely Generic Phenomenology A Reply to Sascha
If representationism is true, phenomenal precision is given by representational precision. But what if representationism is false as I claim? Can we make sense of phenomenal precision? Fink arguesExpand
Why Care beyond the Square? Classical and Extended Shapes of Oppositions in Their Application to “Introspective Disputes”
So called “shapes of opposition”—like the classical square of opposition and its extensions—can be seen as graphical representations of the ways in which types of statements constrain each other inExpand
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