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Journals and Conferences
Are command systems that rest on coercion inherently unstable, and did the Soviet economy collapse for this reason? Postwar evidence is inconsistent with the hypothesis that the Soviet economy was unstable. If it was not unstable, why did it collapse? A repeated game of coordination between a dictator and producers shows that a high level of coercion may… (More)
Half a million sporocysts of Sarcocystis levinei obtained from experimentally infected dogs were fed to a buffalo calf, and sarcocysts of this species were recovered from its oesophageal muscles when the animal was killed on the 62nd day of inoculation, thus establishing a buffalo-dog-buffalo cycle.
Four dogs shed 21 35 900, 49 32 600, 29 59 800 and 37 57 200 sporocysts between 15 and 74 days after being fed bubaline oesophagus which was naturally infected with Sarcocystis Levinei.
Bank crises, by interrupting liquidity provision, have been viewed as resulting in welfare losses. In a model of banking with moral hazard, we show that second best bank contracts that improve on autarky ex ante require costly crises to occur with positive probability at the interim stage. When bank payoffs are partially appropriable, either directly via… (More)
We study banking with ex ante moral hazard. Resolving the mis-alignment of the incentives between banks and depositors requires early liquidation with positive probability: e¢cient risk-sharing between depositors is no longer implementable. In a closed region with a single bank, we show that (i) with costless and perfect monitoring, contracts with bank runs… (More)