Sangmok Lee

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We study a dynamic matching environment where individuals arrive sequentially. There is a tradeo¤ between waiting for a thicker market, allowing for higher quality matches, and minimizing agents' waiting costs. The optimal mechanism cumulates a stock of incongruent pairs up to a threshold and matches all others in an assortative fashion instantaneously. In(More)
We study competition in matching markets with random heterogeneous preferences by considering markets with an unequal number of agents on either side. First, we give a tight description of stable outcomes, showing that matching markets are extremely competitive. Each agent on the short side of the market is matched to one of his top preferences and each(More)
I introduce a model of contagion with endogenous network formation and strategic default, in which a government intervenes to stop contagion. The anticipation of government bailouts introduces a novel channel for moral hazard via its effect on network architecture. In the absence of bailouts, the network formed consists of small clusters that are sparsely(More)
The efficiency ranking of market structures is qualitatively affected by the nature of buyer side peer interactions. To show this, I formulate a model for a two-sided market with competing sellers and a network of buyers whose willingness to purchase varies according to their peers' purchases. Examples of such markets include competing small businesses,(More)
Stability is often the goal for clearinghouses in matching markets, such as those matching residents to hospitals, students to schools, etc. Stable outcomes absent transfers need not be utilitarian e¢ cient, suggesting the potential value of transfers. We study the wedge between stability and e¢ ciency in large one-to-one matching markets. We show stable(More)
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