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The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration
Our theory of costly contracts emphasizes that contractual rights can be of two types: specific rights and residual rights. When it is costly to list all specific rights over assets in the contract,Expand
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On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets
If competitive equilibrium is defined as a situation in which prices are such that all arbitrage profits are eliminated, is it possible that a competitive economy always be in equilibrium? ClearlyExpand
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Most analyses of the principal-agent problem assume that the principal chooses an incentive scheme to maximize expected utility subject to the agent’s utility being at a stationary point. AnExpand
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The free-rider problem and the theory of the corporation
A spray gun especially adapted for dispensing foam type plastics or other coating materials which is characterized by two feed lines for the coating materials which are encased in return lines withExpand
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The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality
The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality Author(s): Sanford J. Grossman Source: Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 24, No. 3, Consumer Protection Regulation:Expand
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Trading Volume and Serial Correlation in Stock Returns
This paper investigates the relationship between aggregate stock market trading volume and the serial correlation of daily stock returns. For both stock indexes and individual large stocks, theExpand
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On the Efficiency of Competitive Stock Markets Where Trades Have Diverse Information
I HAVE SHOWN elsewhere that competitive markets can be "over-informationally" efficient. (See Grossman [1975] for this and a review of other work in this area.) If competitive prices reveal too muchExpand
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Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives
No abstract is available for this paper.
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Liquidity and Market Structure
Market liquidity is modeled as being determined by the demand and supply of immediacy. Exogenous liquidity events coupled with the risk of delayed trade create a demand for immediacy. Market makersExpand
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One Share/One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control
A corporation's securities provide the holder with particular claims on the firm's income stream and particular voting rights. These securities can be designed in various ways: one share of aExpand
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