Sandra D. Mitchell

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In this article, we consider the tension between unification and pluralism in biological theory. We begin with a consideration of historical efforts to establish a unified understanding of evolution in the neo-Darwinian synthesis. The fragmentation of the evolutionary synthesis by molecular evolution suggests the limitations of the general unificationist(More)
Philosophical accounts of emergence have been explicated in terms of logical relationships between statements (derivation) or static properties (function and realization). Jaegwon Kim is a modern proponent. A property is emergent if it is not explainable by (or reducible to) the properties of lower level components. This approach, I will argue, is unable to(More)
The standard rationale for the social sciences being separate disciplines from biology rests on the assertion that human social behavior is uniquely complex. Anthropologists and sociologists often argue that human institutions managing the reproductive, productive, and symbolic features of human social life bear only remote connections to the phenomena of(More)
The various social sciences emerged as distinct modes of inquiry in the latter part of the 19th century. Enlightenment thinking about the inevitable march of human progress was coupled with a metaphorical use of concepts and terms from the other established sciences of physics and biology. The transfer of metaphors between areas of inquiry, back and forth(More)
Infectious myositis is rather uncommon. When caused by anaerobic organisms, myositis is usually polymicrobial. Trauma, ischemia, or a contiguous focus of infection is often an antecedent of myositis. We report a case of monomicrobial veillonella myositis in an immunocompromised patient. The infection responded to debridement and therapy with metronidazole.
Author(s): P. Kyle Stanford Source: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 70, No. 5, Proceedings of the 2002 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science AssociationPart I: Contributed PapersEdited by Sandra D. Mitchell (December 2003), pp. 913-925 Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association Stable URL:(More)
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