Learn More
Two players simultaneously decide whether or not to acquire new weapons in an arms race game. Each player's type determines his propensity to arm. Types are private information, and are independently drawn from a continuous distribution. With probability close to one, the best outcome for each player is for neither to acquire new weapons (although each(More)
1 The paper studies the implementation problem, first analyzed by Maskin and Moore (1999), in which two agents observe an unverifiable state of nature and may renegotiate inefficient outcomes following play of the mechanism. We develop a first-order approach to characterizing the set of implementable utility mappings in this problem, paralleling Mirrlees's(More)
A sender chooses ex ante how her information will be disclosed to a privately informed receiver who then takes one of two actions. The sender wishes to maximize the probability that the receiver takes the desired action. As a result, the sender faces an ex ante tradeo¤ between the frequency and persuasiveness of messages: sending positive messages more(More)
I present a strategic model of competition in price and availability in which demand is uncertain and consumers choose where to shop given firms' observable prices and their expectations of firms' unobservable inventories. In both a single period Cournot model (inventories are chosen first) and a single period Bertrand model (prices are chosen first) I show(More)
We build a game-theoretic model where aggression can be triggered by domestic political concerns as well as the fear of being attacked. In the model, leaders of full and limited democracies risk losing power if they do not stand up to threats from abroad. In addition, the leader of a fully democratic country loses the support of the median voter if he(More)
1 1 We thank seminar participants at Brown, Columbia, Tel Aviv, and Washington Universities. An associate editor and a referee provided useful comments. We also thank V. Bhaskar for valuable discussions and Steve Matthews for pointing out an error in an earlier version. Any remaining errors are our responsibility. Morris is grateful for financial support(More)