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Two players simultaneously decide whether or not to acquire new weapons in an arms race game. Each player’s type determines his propensity to arm. Types are private information, and are independently drawn from a continuous distribution. With probability close to one, the best outcome for each player is for neither to acquire new weapons (although each… (More)

- Ilya Segal, Michael D. Whinston, +5 authors Luis Rayo
- 2001

The paper studies the implementation problem, first analyzed by Maskin and Moore (1999), in which two agents observe an unverifiable state of nature and may renegotiate inefficient outcomes following play of the mechanism. We develop a first-order approach to characterizing the set of implementable utility mappings in this problem, paralleling Mirrlees’s… (More)

- Sandeep Baliga, Tomas Sjo
- 1998

We consider a model where agents work in sequence on a project, share information not available to the principal, and can collude. Due to limited liability the Coase theorem does not apply. The distribution of surplus among the agents is therefore an important control variable for the principal, which gives us a theory of how to delegate in an organization… (More)

- Sandeep Baliga, Stephen Morris
- J. Economic Theory
- 2002

1 We thank seminar participants at Brown, Columbia, Tel Aviv, and Washington Universities. An associate editor and a referee provided useful comments. We also thank V. Bhaskar for valuable discussions and Steve Matthews for pointing out an error in an earlier version. Any remaining errors are our responsibility. Morris is grateful for financial support from… (More)

- Sandeep Baliga
- 1999

In the standard principal-supervisor-agent model with collusion, Tirole (1986) shows that employing a supervisor is profitable for the principal if the supervisor’s signal of the agent’s cost of production is “hard” (i.e., verifiable but hideable). Anecdotal evidence suggests that information is sometimes “soft” (i.e., unverifiable). We show that, in fact,… (More)

- James D. Dana, Sandeep Baliga, +7 authors Jeroen Swinkels
- 2000

I present a strategic model of competition in price and availability in which demand is uncertain and consumers choose where to shop given firms’ observable prices and their expectations of firms’ unobservable inventories. In both a single period Cournot model (inventories are chosen first) and a single period Bertrand model (prices are chosen first) I show… (More)

- SANDEEP BALIGA
- 2006

We build a game-theoretic model where aggression can be triggered by domestic political concerns as well as the fear of being attacked. In the model, leaders of full and limited democracies risk losing power if they do not stand up to threats from abroad. In addition, the leader of a fully democratic country loses the support of the median voter if he… (More)

- Anton Kolotiliny, Ricardo Alonso, +6 authors Hongyi Li
- 2012

A sender chooses ex ante how her information will be disclosed to a privately informed receiver who then takes one of two actions. The sender wishes to maximize the probability that the receiver takes the desired action. As a result, the sender faces an ex ante tradeo¤ between the frequency and persuasiveness of messages: sending positive messages more… (More)

We argue that when externalities such as pollution are nonexcludable, agents must be compelled to participate in a "mechanism" to ensure a Pareto-efficient outcome. We survey some of the main findings of the mechanism-design (implementation-theory) literature such as the Nash implementation theorem, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, the… (More)

- Eran Hanany, Peter Klibanoff, +5 authors Raphaël Giraud
- 2008

Dynamic consistency leads to Bayesian updating under expected utility. We ask what it implies for the updating of more general preferences. In this paper, we characterize dynamically consistent update rules for preference models satisfying ambiguity aversion. This characterization extends to regret-based models as well. As applications of our general… (More)