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This paper describes experiments in Machine Learning for text classification using a new representation of text based on WordNet hypernyms. Six binary classification tasks of varying difficulty are defined, and the Ripper system is used to produce discrimination rules for each task using the new hypernym density representation. Rules are also produced with(More)
Most research in text classification to date has used a “bag of words” representation in which each feature corresponds to a single word. This paper examines some alternative ways to represent text based on syntactic and semantic relationships between words (phrases, synonyms and hypernyms). We describe the new representations and try to justify our(More)
The Learning with Errors (LWE) problem has become a central building block of modern cryptographic constructions. This work collects and presents hardness results for concrete instances of LWE. In particular, we discuss algorithms proposed in the literature and give the expected resources required to run them. We consider both generic instances of LWE as(More)
After a development process of many months, the TLS 1.3 specification is nearly complete. To prevent past mistakes, this crucial security protocol must be thoroughly scrutinised prior to deployment. In this work we model and analyse revision 10 of the TLS 1.3 specification using the Tamarin prover, a tool for the automated analysis of security protocols. We(More)
This paper brings together two definitions of metarepresentation: Dennett's notion of metarepresentation as second-order representation, and an alternative definition of metarepresentation found in the work of Leslie, Frith, and Baron-Cohen on autistic children. I show that the two definitions are not in any way compatible with one another, and that the(More)
Conceptual Atomism (CA) is the view that psychological concepts are atoms (no internal structure, no necessary relations to other concepts). CA is a psychological/semantic theory. I show that CA has become mixed up with a separate, meta-semantic project that seeks to naturalize content, and that this Naturalized Conceptual Atomism has ended up in the(More)
A common presupposition in the concepts literature is that concepts constitute a singular natural kind. If, on the contrary, concepts split into more than one kind, this literature needs to be recast in terms of other kinds of mental representation. We offer two new arguments that concepts, in fact, divide into different kinds: (a) concepts split because(More)