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  • Vianney Dequiedt, David Martimort, Olivier Compte, Philippe Jehiel, Peter Klibanoff, Frédéric Koessler +7 others
  • 2007
Suppose a principal cannot commit to a centralized grand-mechanism with all his privately informed agents but can only sign public bilateral contracts with each of them. The principal can manipulate what he learns by contracting with an agent when dealing with others. Introducing this possibility for manipulations may simplify significantly optimal(More)
INTRODUCTION Risk stratification in congestive heart failure (CHF) patients is based on a variety of clinical and laboratory variables. We analysed renal function, BNP, water composition, echocardiographic and functional determinations in predicting mid-term outcome in CHF patients discharged after decompensation. MATERIAL AND METHODS All subjects with(More)
We explore the strategic value of incomplete contracts in a competing hierarchies environment under adverse selection and moral hazard. We show that principals dealing with (exclusive) competing agents, may prefer to leave contracts silent on some (potentially) veri…able performance measures whenever certain other aspects of agents'activity remain(More)
BACKGROUND Acute decompensation heart failure (ADHF) remains a cause of hospitalization in patients with end-stage congestive HF. The administration of levosimendan in comparison with a standard therapy in CHF patients admitted for ADHF was analysed. MATERIAL/METHODS Consecutive patients admitted for ADHF (NYHA class III-IV) were treated with levosimendan(More)
  • Federico Boffa, Viswanath Pingali, Davide Vannoni, Carlo Andrea Bollino, Michael Coates, Reinout Debock +12 others
  • 2015
a r t i c l e i n f o We estimate the benefits (in terms of savings to end-users) resulting from an improved interconnectivity in the Italian electricity spot market. The market is currently divided into two geographic zones – North and South – with limited inter-zonal transmission capacity that often induces congestion, and hence potential inefficiency. By(More)
  • Daniel García, Jun Honda, Maarten Janssen, Alexei Parakhonyak, Salvatore Piccolo, Régis Renault +2 others
  • 2015
We study vertical relations in markets with consumer and retailer search. Retailers search to learn manufacturers' prices. We obtain three important new results. First, we explain why empirical distributions of retail prices are bi-modal, with a regular price and a sales price. Second, under competitive conditions (many retailers or small consumer search(More)
When do competing principals independently choose to share the information obtained from their privately informed agents? Information sharing a¤ects contracting relationships within opponent organizations and induces players'strategies to be correlated via the distortions channel. We show that principals' incentives to share information depend on the nature(More)
This paper highlights the rationale for exclusive territories in a model of repeated interaction between competing supply chains. We show that with observable contracts exclusive territories have two countervailing effects on manufacturers' incentives to sustain tacit collusion. First, granting local monopolies to retailers softens competition in a one-shot(More)
  • Federico Boffa, Carlo Scarpa, Presidente Giovanni, Fraquelli Segretario, Cristina Piai, Giovanni Fraquelli +20 others
  • 2006
I diritti di riproduzione, di memorizzazione e di adattamento totale o parziale con qualsiasi mezzo (compresi microfilm e copie fotostatiche) sono riservati. Abstract The paper examines the e¤ects of interconnecting two (network) markets that previously were totally separated. In each market di¤erent capacity-constrained …rms operate. Firms collude whenever(More)
We study a general equilibrium model where agents'preferences and productivity depend on their health status, and indivisible occupational choices a¤ect health risks. We show that e¢ ciency typically requires agents of the same type to obtain di¤erent expected utility when assigned to di¤erent occupations. If health mainly a¤ects production capabilities,(More)