Approximating the optimal social welfare while preserving truthfulness is a well studied problem in algorithmic mechanism design. Assuming that the social welfare of a given mechanism design problemâ€¦ (More)

We study the problem of maximizing constrained non-monotone submodular functions and provide approximation algorithms that improve existing algorithms in terms of either the approximation factor orâ€¦ (More)

In this paper, we study a mechanism design problem for a strategic variant of the generalized assignment problem (GAP) in a both payment-free and priorfree environment. In GAP, a set of items has toâ€¦ (More)

We propose a truthful-in-expectation, (1 âˆ’ 1 e )-approximation mechanism for the generalized assignment auction. In such an auction, each bidder has a knapsack valuation function and biddersâ€™ valuesâ€¦ (More)

Mechanism design with agents who do not have quasi-linear preferences is an important line of research in social choice theory. Finding domains which admit truthful mechanisms is of centralâ€¦ (More)

In some markets bidders want to maximize value subject to a budget constraint rather than payoff. This is different to the quasilinear utility functions typically assumed in auction theory and leadsâ€¦ (More)

We propose a truthful-in-expectation, (1-1/e)-approximation mechanism for a strategic variant of the generalized assignment problem (GAP). In GAP, a set of items has to be optimally assigned to a setâ€¦ (More)

In random allocation rules, typically first an optimal fractional point is calculated via solving a linear program. Lying in the feasible region of the linear program, the fractional point satisfiesâ€¦ (More)