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In this paper, we study a problem of truthful mechanism design for a strategic variant of the generalized assignment problem (GAP) in a both payment-free and prior-free environment. In GAP, a set of items has to be optimally assigned to a set of bins without exceeding the capacity of any singular bin. In the strategic variant of the problem we study, bins(More)
We propose a truthful-in-expectation, (1 − 1 e)-approximation mechanism for the generalized assignment auction. In such an auction, each bidder has a knapsack valuation function and bidders' values for items are private. We present a novel convex optimization program for the auction which results in a maximal-in-distributional-range (MIDR) allocation rule.(More)
Approximating the optimal social welfare while preserving truthfulness is a well studied problem in algorithmic mechanism design. Assuming that the social welfare of a given mechanism design problem can be optimized by an integer program whose integrality gap is at most α, Lavi and Swamy [1] propose a general approach to designing a randomized(More)