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  • Influence
Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment
We consider a bilateral trading problem in which one or both parties makes relationship-specific investments before trade. Without adequate contractual protection, the prospect of later holdupsExpand
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Investment Decisions and Managerial Performance Evaluation
This paper considers incentive provisions for a manager who makes investment decisions. The manager's performance measure can be based on current accounting information: cash flow, depreciation, bookExpand
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Integrating Managerial and Tax Objectives in Transfer Pricing
This paper examines transfer pricing in multinational firms when individual divisions face different income tax rates. Assuming that a firm decouples its internal transfer price from the arm's lengthExpand
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Dominant Strategy Implementation of Bayesian incentive Compatible Allocation Rules
Abstract A large literature on incentive mechanisms represents incentive constraints by the requirement that truthful reporting be a Bayesian equilibrium. This paper identifies mechanism designExpand
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Game forms with minimal message spaces
This paper is concerned with the amount of communication that must be provided to implement a performance standard by a mechanism whose stationary messages have the Nash property. In p articular, theExpand
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Specific investment under negotiated transfer pricing: An efficiency result
In our model of negotiated transfer pricing, divisional managers can make specific investments that enhance the value of intrafirm trade. However, these investments are irreversible and must be madeExpand
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The Prospects for Cost Competitive Solar PV Power
New solar Photovoltaic (PV) installations have grown globally at a rapid pace in recent years. We provide a comprehensive assessment of the cost competitiveness of this electric power source. BasedExpand
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Cost Allocation for Capital Budgeting Decisions
Investment decisions frequently require coordination across multiple divisions of a firm. This paper explores a class of capital budgeting mechanisms in which the divisions issue reports regardingExpand
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Hierarchical decentralization of incentive contracts
Agents in a hierarchy are commonly delegated authority to communicate and contract with agents at lower levels. While delegation reduces the burden of communication and information processing on theExpand
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Negotiated versus Cost-Based Transfer Pricing
This paper studies an incomplete contracting model to compare the effectiveness of alternative transfer pricing mechanisms. Transfer pricing serves the dual purpose of guiding intracompany transfersExpand
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