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Matroid prophet inequalities
TLDR
We show that a gambler who observes a sequence of independent, non-negative random numbers can achieve at least half as much reward, in expectation, as a "prophet" who knows the sampled values of each random variable and can choose the largest one. Expand
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On the Instability of Bitcoin Without the Block Reward
TLDR
We show that whether miners are paid by block rewards or transaction fees does not affect the security of the block chain, and even non-equilibria. Expand
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A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer
TLDR
We consider a monopolist seller with n heterogeneous items, facing a single buyer. Expand
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An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms
TLDR
We show that every feasible, Bayesian, multi-item multi-bidder mechanism for independent, additive bidders can be implemented as a mechanism that: (a) allocates every item independently of the other items; (b) for the allocation of each item it uses a strict ordering of all bbiders' types; and allocates the item using a distribution over hierarchical mechanisms that iron this ordering into a non-strict ordering. Expand
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Simple Mechanisms for a Subadditive Buyer and Applications to Revenue Monotonicity
TLDR
We show that if D is a distribution over subadditive valuations with independent items, then the better of pricing each item separately or pricing only the grand bundle achieves a constant-factor approximation to the revenue of the optimal mechanism. Expand
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Prophet Inequalities with Limited Information
TLDR
We construct the first single-sample prophet inequalities for many settings of interest, whose guarantees all match the best possible asymptotically. Expand
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Optimal Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design: Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization
TLDR
We provide a reduction from revenue maximization to welfare maximization in multidimensional Bayesian auctions with arbitrary - possibly combinatorial - feasibility constraints, appropriately extending Myerson's single-dimensional result [21] to this setting. Expand
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Arbitrum: Scalable, private smart contracts
TLDR
We present Arbitrum, a cryptocurrency system that supports smart contracts without the scalability and privacy limitations of previous systems such as Ethereum. Expand
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Symmetries and optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design
TLDR
We efficiently solve the optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design problem for independent additive bidders with arbitrary demands when either the number of bbidders is held constant, or when the value distributions are unbounded, but satisfy the Monotone Hazard Rate condition. Expand
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A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design
We provide a unified view of many recent developments in Bayesian mechanism design, including the black-box reductions of Cai, Daskalakis, and Weinberg [in Proceedings of the 54th Annual IEEE Sympo...
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