• Publications
  • Influence
More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust and Crowding
Most contracts, whether between voters and politicians or between house owners and contractors, are incomplete. “More law,” it typically is assumed, increases the likelihood of contract performanceExpand
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Does information about competitors' actions increase or decrease competition in experimental oligopoly markets?
This paper investigates the impact of information about rivals' actions on the competitiveness of experimental oligopoly markets. We compare two treatments: in one, firms are informed about theirExpand
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The Relevance of Equal Splits in Ultimatum Games
TLDR
We present a slightly altered version of the mini ultimatum game of G. Bolton and Zwick in which the “fair offer” can be slightly unfair. Expand
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Playing Cournot although they shouldn’t
Summary.In this note, we experimentally investigate the extended game with action commitment in a Cournot duopoly with asymmetric cost. Risk dominance considerations allow to select a uniqueExpand
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Imitation - Theory and Experimental Evidence
TLDR
We introduce a generalized theoretical approach to study imitation models and subject the models to rigorous experimental testing. Expand
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Behavioral Economics as Applied to Firms: A Primer
We discuss the literatures on behavioral economics, bounded rationality and experimental economics as they apply to firm behaviour in markets. Topics discussed include the impact of imitative andExpand
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Allais for all: Revisiting the paradox in a large representative sample
We administer the Allais paradox questions to both a representative sample of the Dutch population and to student subjects. Three treatments are implemented: one with the original high hypotheticalExpand
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Burning money and (pseudo) first-mover advantages: an experimental study on forward induction
TLDR
The mere potential for one player to burn money prior to play has been shown in theory to be an effective device to select this player’s most preferred outcome, e.g., in the battle-of-the-sexes game [J. Econ. Theory 48 (1989) 476, J. Theory 57 (1992) 36]. Expand
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To Commit or Not to Commit: Endogenous Timing in Experimental Duopoly Markets
TLDR
We experimentally investigate the extended game with action commitment of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). Expand
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Competition Fosters Trust
TLDR
We study the effects of reputation and competition in a trust game. Expand
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