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A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium
We propose a simple adaptive procedure for playing a game. In this procedure, players depart from their current play with probabilities that are proportional to measures of regret for not having usedExpand
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Potential, value, and consistency
Let P be a real-valued function defined on the space of cooperative games with transferable utility, satisfying the following condition: In every game, the marginal contributions of all playersExpand
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On the endogenous formation of coalitions
THE FORMATION OF COALITIONS is a fundamental problem in game theory. By a "coalition" is meant a group of "players" (e.g., economic or political agents) which decide to act together, as one unit,Expand
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A Reinforcement Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium
We consider repeated games where at any period each player knows only his set of actions and the stream of payoffs that he has received in the past. He knows neither his own payoff function, nor theExpand
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An Operational Measure of Riskiness
  • D. Foster, S. Hart
  • Psychology, Economics
  • Journal of Political Economy
  • 1 October 2009
We propose a measure of riskiness of “gambles” (risky assets) that is objective: it depends only on the gamble and not on the decision maker. The measure is based on identifying for every gamble theExpand
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Bargaining and Value
The authors present and analyze a model of noncooperative bargaining among n participants, applied to situations describable as games in coalitional form. This leads to a unified solution theory forExpand
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Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
  • S. Hart
  • Mathematics, Computer Science
  • Math. Oper. Res.
  • 1 February 1985
Characterization of all equilibria of nonzero-sum two-person repeated games with incomplete information, in the standard one-sided information case. Expand
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Existence of Correlated Equilibria
An elementary proof, based on linear duality, is provided for the existence of correlated equilibria in finite games. Expand
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Long Cheap Talk
With cheap talk, more can be achieved by long conversations than by a single message-even when one side is strictly better informed than the other. ("Cheap talk" means plain conversation-unmediated,Expand
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Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications
Preface (R.J. Aumann, S. Hart). Strategic equilibrium (E. van Damme). Foundations of strategic equilibrium (J. Hillas, E. Kohlberg). Incomplete information (R.J. Aumann, A. Heifetz). Non-zero-sumExpand
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