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Choice under uncertainty with the best and worst in mind: Neo-additive capacities
TLDR
We develop the simplest generalization of subjective expected utility that can accommodate both optimistic and pessimistic attitudes towards uncertainty-Choquet expected utility with non-extreme-outcome-additive (neo- additive) capacities. Expand
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Updating Choquet Beliefs
We apply Pires’s coherence property between unconditional and conditional preferences that admit a CEU representation. In conjunction with consequentialism (only those outcomes on states which areExpand
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First Author Conditions
This paper provides a theoretical explanation for the persistent use of alphabetical name-orderings on academic papers in economics. In a context where market participants are interested inExpand
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Mean-dispersion preferences and constant absolute uncertainty aversion
TLDR
We axiomatize, in an Anscombe-Aumann framework, the class of preferences that admit a representation of the form V(f) = mu - rho(d), where mu is the mean utility of the act f with respect to a given probability, d is the vector of state-by-state utility deviations from the mean, and rho is a measure of (aversion to) dispersion that corresponds to an uncertainty premium. Expand
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Intrinsic Preference for Information
Suppose, following Kreps & Porteus (1978), that an agent values information not only to make contingent plans but also for itself; that is, intrinsically. What, then, is the relationship between anExpand
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Subjective probability without monotonicity: or how Machina's mom may also be probabilistically sophisticated
If an agent's preferences over subjectively uncertain acts are consistent with him having a subjective probability distribution over the states of nature, then those preferences can induce consistentExpand
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The α-MEU model: A comment
TLDR
In [7] Ghirardato, Macheroni and Marinacci (GMM) propose a method for distinguishing between perceived ambiguity and the decision-maker's reaction to it. Expand
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Ausi Expected Utility: An Anticipated Utility Theory of Relative Disappointment Aversion
In recent years there has been a growing theoretical, experimental and empirical challenge to Expected Utility Theory, the overwhelmingly dominant paradigm for modeling decision-making under risk.Expand
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Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty and Recursive Non‐expected Utility Models
If an agent (wealkly) prefers early resolution of uncertainty then the recursive forms of both the most commonly used non-expected utility models, betweenness and rank dependence, almost reduce toExpand
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Inductive reasoning about unawareness
We develop a model of games with awareness that allows for differential levels of awareness. We show that, for the standard modal-logical interpretations of belief and awareness, a player cannotExpand
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