• Publications
  • Influence
Quantifiers and propositional attitudes: Quine revisited
We defend the spirit of Quine’s account of attitudes by offering solutions to the problem of the ‘exportation’ of singular terms within attitude contexts. Expand
  • 17
  • 4
A solution for Russellians to a puzzle about belief
cannot diverge in truth value, since they express the same proposition. The problem for the Russellian (or the 'Millian') is that a puzzle of David Kaplan's (1968-69: 511) seems to show that they canExpand
  • 14
  • 2
Pure Russellianism
Abstract According to Russellianism, the content of a Russellian thought, in which a person ascribes a monadic property to an object, can be represented as an ordered couple of the object and theExpand
  • 4
  • 1
Propositional or non-propositional attitudes?
Propositionalism is the view that intentional attitudes, such as belief, are relations to propositions. Propositionalists argue that propositionalism follows from the intuitive validity of certainExpand
  • 4
  • PDF
On the Logical Positivists' Philosophy of Psychology: Laying a Legend to Rest
  • S. Crawford
  • Philosophy, Computer Science
  • New Directions in the Philosophy of Science
  • 2014
The received view in the history of the philosophy of psychology is that the logical positivists – Carnap and Hempel in particular – endorsed the position commonly known as “logical” or “analytical” behaviourism, according to which the relations between psychological statements and the physical-behavioural statements intended to give their meaning are analytic and knowable a priori. Expand
  • 3
  • PDF
St Patrick's Well (near Donadea)
Story collected by Tom Manders, a student at Hewetson, Clane school (Millicent North, Co. Kildare) (no informant identified).
In Defence of Object-Dependent Thoughts
The existence of object-dependent thoughts has been doubted on the grounds that reference to such houghts is unnecessary or 'redundant' in the psychological explanation of intentional action. ThisExpand
  • 5