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THE REJECTION OF EPISTEMIC CONSEQUENTIALISM
[Forthcoming in Philosophical Issues, after revisions.]
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Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions
When it comes to epistemic normativity, should we take the good to be prior to the right? That is, should we ground facts about what we ought and ought not believe on a given occasion in facts aboutExpand
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Particular Reasons*
According to contemporary physics, there are four fundamental forces: the strong nuclear, weak nuclear, electromagnetic, and gravitational. One of the greatest successes of twentieth-century physicsExpand
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it as “Notes on ‘The Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience ’ by Selim Berker.”
What follows is a set of notes that I prepared for a small meeting of philosophers and scientists at Arizona State University. Attendees circulated papers to one another prior to the meeting. SelimExpand
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The Explanatory Ambitions of Moral Principles
Moral properties are explained by other properties. And moral principles tell us about moral properties. How are these two ideas related? In particular, is the truth of a given moral principle partExpand
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Reply to Goldman: Cutting Up the One to Save the Five in Epistemology
I argue that Alvin Goldman has failed to save process reliabilism from my critique in earlier work of consequentialist or teleological epistemic theories. First, Goldman misconstrues the nature of myExpand
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The Game of Belief Final Version as Submitted 14 June 2019
It is plausible that there is a distinctively epistemic standard of correctness for belief. It is also plausible that there are a range of practical reasons bearing on belief. These theses are oftenExpand
The Normative Insignificance of Neurosciencepapa
reasoning, it should come as no surprise if we have innate responses to personal violence that are powerful but rather primitive. That is, we might expect humans to have negative emotional responsesExpand
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MACKIE WAS NOT AN ERROR THEORIST