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- Publications
- Influence
THE REJECTION OF EPISTEMIC CONSEQUENTIALISM
- S. Berker
- Philosophy
- 1 October 2013
[Forthcoming in Philosophical Issues, after revisions.]
Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions
- S. Berker
- Philosophy
- 1 July 2013
When it comes to epistemic normativity, should we take the good to be prior to the right? That is, should we ground facts about what we ought and ought not believe on a given occasion in facts about… Expand
A Combinatorial Argument against Practical Reasons for Belief
- S. Berker
- Philosophy
- 1 December 2018
Particular Reasons*
- S. Berker
- Ethics
- 1 October 2007
According to contemporary physics, there are four fundamental forces: the strong nuclear, weak nuclear, electromagnetic, and gravitational. One of the greatest successes of twentieth-century physics… Expand
it as “Notes on ‘The Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience ’ by Selim Berker.”
What follows is a set of notes that I prepared for a small meeting of philosophers and scientists at Arizona State University. Attendees circulated papers to one another prior to the meeting. Selim… Expand
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- PDF
The Explanatory Ambitions of Moral Principles
- S. Berker
- Philosophy
- 1 December 2019
Moral properties are explained by other properties. And moral principles tell us about moral properties. How are these two ideas related? In particular, is the truth of a given moral principle part… Expand
Reply to Goldman: Cutting Up the One to Save the Five in Epistemology
- S. Berker
- Philosophy
- 1 June 2015
I argue that Alvin Goldman has failed to save process reliabilism from my critique in earlier work of consequentialist or teleological epistemic theories. First, Goldman misconstrues the nature of my… Expand
The Game of Belief Final Version as Submitted 14 June 2019
- B. Maguire, J. Woods, +29 authors K. Schafer
- 2019
It is plausible that there is a distinctively epistemic standard of correctness for belief. It is also plausible that there are a range of practical reasons bearing on belief. These theses are often… Expand
The Normative Insignificance of Neurosciencepapa
- S. Berker
- 2009
reasoning, it should come as no surprise if we have innate responses to personal violence that are powerful but rather primitive. That is, we might expect humans to have negative emotional responses… Expand
- 2
- PDF