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Ranking Sets of Objects
We provide a survey of the literature on ranking sets of objects. The interpretations of those set ranking include those employed in the theory of choice under complete uncertianty, rankings ofExpand
Voting by Committees
Problems of social choice frequently take the following form. There are n voters and a set K = (1,2,...,k) of objects. The voters must choose a subset of K. We define a class of voting schemes calledExpand
Strategy-proof social choice
This paper surveys the literature on strategy-proofness from a historical perspective. While I discuss the connections with other works on incentives in mechanism design, the main emphasis is onExpand
Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees
Abstract We define a multidimensional analogue of a single-peaked preference and generalize the notion of a median voter scheme. Every onto strategy-proof social choice function on a single-peakedExpand
Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
SummaryThis paper explores the possibility of designing strategy-proof mechanisms yielding satisfactory solutions to the marriage and to the college admissions problem. Our first result is negative.Expand
Strategy-Proof Exchange
We consider the allocation of goods in exchange economies with a finite number of agents who may have private information about their preferences. In such a setting, standard allocation rules such asExpand
THE MANIPULATION OF SOCIAL CHOICE MECHANISMS THAT DO NOT LEAVE "TOO MUCH" TO CHANCE'
In this paper we study the possibility of constructing satisfactory social choice mechanisms whose outcomes are determined by a combination of voting and chance. The following theorem is obtained: ifExpand
On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union
Consider a voting procedure where countries, states, or districts comprising a union each elect representatives who then participate in later votes at the union level on their behalf. The countries,Expand
Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules
We consider the problem of alloting shares of a task or good among agents with single peaked preferences over their own shares. Previous characterizations have examined rules, such as the uniformExpand
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