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Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions: Expanding Single Buyer Mechanisms to Many Buyers
  • S. Alaei
  • Mathematics, Computer Science
  • IEEE 52nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of…
  • 5 June 2011
TLDR
We present a general decomposition technique for Bayesian combinatorial auctions where the objective function is linearly separable over the set of buyers. Expand
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  • 14
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Bayesian optimal auctions via multi- to single-agent reduction
TLDR
We study an abstract optimal auction problem for selecting a subset of self-interested agents to whom to provide a service. Expand
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  • 13
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Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions: Expanding Single Buyer Mechanisms to Many Buyers
  • S. Alaei
  • Economics, Computer Science
  • FOCS
  • 22 October 2011
TLDR
We present a general decomposition technique for Bayesian combinatorial auctions where the objective function is linearly separable over the set of buyers. Expand
  • 64
  • 11
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Online prophet-inequality matching with applications to ad allocation
TLDR
We study the problem of online prophet-inequality matching in bipartite graphs. Expand
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  • 8
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On random sampling auctions for digital goods
TLDR
We prove that RSOP is 4-competitive for a large class of instances in which the number λ of bidders receiving the item at the optimal uniform price, is at least 6. Expand
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Optimal Auctions vs. Anonymous Pricing
TLDR
This paper considers the approximate optimality of anonymous pricing and auctions with anonymous reserves, e.g., eBay’s buy-it-now pricing and auction. Expand
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A Dynamic Model of Crowdfunding
TLDR
We provide a model of crowdfunding in which consumers arrive sequentially and make decisions about whether to pledge or not. Expand
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The Simple Economics of Approximately Optimal Auctions
TLDR
This paper considers mechanism design in environments where the agents have multi-dimensional and non-linear preferences. Expand
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Maximizing Sequence-Submodular Functions and its Application to Online Advertising
TLDR
In this paper, we define the notion of Sequence Submodularity for functions defined over sequences and then showed that if a sequence function is submodular and non-decreasing, the approximation ratio of greedy algorithm for maximizing such a function subject to a maximum length constraint on the solution sequence is (1− 1e ). Expand
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Online allocation of display advertisements subject to advanced sales contracts
TLDR
In this paper we propose a utility model that accounts for both sales and branding advertisers, and design a simple online algorithm with provable approximation guarantees. Expand
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