S. Straub

Learn More
We construct a regulation model in which renegotiation occurs due to the imperfect enforcement of concession contracts. This enables us to provide theoretical predictions for the impact, on the probability of renegotiation of a concession, of regulatory institutions, institutional features, economic shocks and of the characteristics of the concession(More)
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings,(More)
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings,(More)
This paper reports on the first functional 6V, 4Mb silicon nanocrystal based nonvolatile memory array using conventional 90nm and 0.25/spl mu/m process technologies. The silicon nanocrystal based NOR Flash can be programmed and erased using conventional techniques in floating gate memories. Key aspects of this technology are the ability to form nanocrystals(More)
We provide micro-level evidence of the cost of rent-seeking for economic development, by showing how entrepreneurs' economic incentives are distorted toward unproductive activities as the result of systematic favoritism in the allocation of public contracts in Paraguay. We start by building a model of entrepreneurial choices, which provides predictions(More)
for helpful comments, Keather Wheelock for style corrections and Helene Ecklin for editing assistance. We are especially indebted to Marco Pagano and Tullio Jappelli for their direction and comments during the stay of one of the authors (Stéphane Straub) at the University of Salerno, as well as to Lia Ambrosio for her kind and efficient assistance. Las(More)
This paper investigates the role of guilt aversion for corruption in public administration. Corruption is modeled as the outcome of a game played between a bureaucrat, a lobby, and the public. There is a moral cost of corruption for the bureaucrat, who is averse to letting the public down. We study how the behavior of the lobby and the bureaucrat depend on(More)