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This paper presents a new model for multi-issue negotiation under time constraints in an incomplete information setting. The issues to be bargained over can be associated with a single good/service or multiple goods/services. In our agenda based model, the order in which issues are bargained over and agreements are reached is determined endogenously, as(More)
This paper studies bilateral multi-issue negotiation between self-interested autonomous agents. Now, there are a number of different procedures that can be used for this process; the three main ones being the package deal procedure in which all the issues are bundled and discussed together, the simultaneous procedure in which the issues are discussed(More)
This paper studies bilateral multi-issue negotiation between self-interested agents. The outcome of such encounters depends on two key factors: the agenda (i.e., the set of issues under negotiation) and the negotiation procedure (i.e., whether the issues are discussed together or separately). Against this background, this paper analyses such negotiations by(More)
This paper analyzes the process of automated negotiation between two competitive agents that have firm deadlines and incomplete information about their opponent. Generally speaking, the outcome of a negotiation depends on many parameters—including the agents' preferences, their reservation limits, their attitude toward time and the strategies they use.(More)
There are two ways of handling bilateral multi-issue negotiations -- one is to negotiate all the issues together, and the other is to negotiate them one by one. The order in which issues are negotiated in issue-by-issue negotiation is specified by the agenda, which can be defined in two ways. One way is to decide it <i>exogenously</i>, i.e., before(More)
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t The Shapley value is a key solution concept for coalitional games in general and voting games in particular. Its main advantage is that it provides a unique and fair solution, but its main drawback is the complexity of computing it (e.g., for voting games this complexity is #p-complete). However, given the importance of(More)
Most of the existing work in the study of bargaining behavior uses techniques from game theory. Game theoretic models for bargaining assume that players are perfectly rational and that this rationality is common knowledge. However, the perfect rationality assumption does not hold for real-life bargaining scenarios with humans as players, since results from(More)
The Shapley value is one of the key solution concepts for coalition games. Its main advantage is that it provides a unique and fair solution, but its main problem is that, for many coalition games, the Shapley value cannot be determined in polynomial time. In particular, the problem of finding this value for the <i>voting game</i> is known to be #P-complete(More)
This paper introduces a Grammar-based Genetic Programming Hyper-Heuristic framework (GPHH) for evolving constructive heuristics for timetabling. In this application GP is used as an online learning method which evolves heuristics while solving the problem. In other words, the system keeps on evolving heuristics for a problem instance until a good solution(More)
This paper studies bilateral, multi-issue negotiation between self-interested agents with deadlines. There are a number of procedures for negotiating the issues and each of these gives a different outcome. Thus, a key problem is to decide which one to use. Given this, we study the three main alternatives: the package deal, the simultaneous procedure, and(More)