Sébastien Courtin

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This work provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the dominance solvability of approval voting games. Our conditions are very simple since they are based on the approval relation, a binary relation between the alternatives. We distinguish between two sorts of dominance solvability and prove that the most stringent one leads to the election of the(More)
Quantum tunnelling through a potential barrier (such as occurs in nuclear fusion) is very sensitive to the detailed structure of the system and its intrinsic degrees of freedom. A strong increase of the fusion probability has been observed for heavy deformed nuclei. In light exotic nuclei such as 6He, 11Li and 11Be (termed 'halo' nuclei), the neutron matter(More)
The desirability relation was introduced by Isbell (1958) to qualitatively compare the a priori influence of voters in a simple game. In this paper, we extend this desirability relation to simple games with coalition structure. In these games, players organize themselves into a priori disjoint coalitions. It appears that the desirability relation defined in(More)
A Condorcet social choice procedure elects the candidate that beats every other candidate under simple majority when such a candidate exists. The reinforcement axiom roughly states that given two groups of individuals, if these two groups select the same alternative, then this alternative must also be selected by their union. Condorcet social choice(More)
A novel method of deducing the deformation of the N=Z nucleus 76Sr is presented. It is based on the comparison of the experimental Gamow-Teller strength distribution B(GT) from its beta decay with the results of quasi-random-phase approximation calculations. This method confirms previous indications of the strong prolate deformation of this nucleus in a(More)
It is commonly accepted that the multiplicity of equilibria is ubiquitous in preference aggregation games with any voting method. We prove that this mul-tiplicity is greatly reduced under some mild restrictions over social preferences when each voter can vote for as many candidates as she wishes (the Approval voting method). For scenarios with three(More)
According to a given quota q, a candidate a is beaten by another candidate b if at least a proportion of q individuals prefer b to a. The q-Condorcet efficiency of a voting rule is the probability that the rule selects a q-Condorcet winner (q-CW), that is any candidate who is never beaten under the q-majority. Closed form representations are obtained for(More)