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This paper examines a dynamic process of unilateral and joint deviations of agents and the resulting stochastic evolution of social conventions in a class of interactions that includes normal form games, network formation games, and simple exchange economies. Over time agents unilaterally and jointly revise their strategies based on the improvements that(More)
We consider models of deterministic evolution in games with finite strategies in which populations of agents interact with themselves and with each other. All populations have a same set of strategies and an identical payoff function, but they differ in their imitative decision rules. We show that all the populations will have an identical distribution over(More)
This paper considers marriage problems, roommate problems with nonempty core, and college admissions problems with responsive preferences. All stochastically stable matchings are shown to be contained in the set of matchings which are most robust to one-shot deviation.
We formulate best response dynamic in a multitasking environment; while agents engage in two separate games concurrently, an agent can switch action only in one of them upon receipt of a revision opportunity. The choice of the game in which to revise action makes the multitasking dynamic significantly behave differently from the separate dynamics so the(More)
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