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What motivates people when they make decisions and how those motivations are potentially entangled with concerns for others are central topics for the social, cognitive, and behavioral sciences. According to the postulate of narrow self-interest, decision makers have the goal of maximizing personal payoffs and are wholly indifferent to the consequences for(More)
We report the results of two experiments with different parameter sets designed to study sequential observation and selection decision problems in which payoffs increase monotonically in the quality of the selected alternative. In this class of search problems, applicants are interviewed one at a time, decision makers only learn the applicant's rank(More)
We present a generalization of a class of sequential search problems with ordinal ranks (" secretary " problems) in which applicants are characterized by multiple attributes that are evaluated independently. We then present a procedure for numerically computing the optimal search policy and test it in two experiments with incentive-compatible payoffs. With(More)
We study a problem of selling a fixed number of goods over a finite and known horizon. After presenting a procedure for computing optimal decision policies and some numerical results on a simple heuristic policy for the problem, we describe results from three experiments involving financially motivated subjects. The experiments reveal that decision makers(More)
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. Why does the adherence to norms not prevent conflict? While the current literature focuses on the emergence, maintenance and impact of norms with regard to cooperation, the issue of norm-related conflict deserves more attention. We develop a general game theoretical(More)
We study a class of sequential selection and assignment problems, where a decision maker (DM) must sequentially assign applicants to positions in an attempt to minimize total expected cost. In modeling this class of problems, we assume that the DM is only informed of the rank of an applicant relative to the applicants that she previously observed and(More)