Ryan C. McDevitt

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This paper investigates consumer switching costs in the context of health insurance markets, where adverse selection is a potential concern. Switching costs contribute to poor choices when the market environment changes and consumers do not adjust appropriately. Though previous work has studied the problems of adverse selection and consumer choice(More)
useful conversations. We thank the Searle Foundation and the Kaufman Foundation for funding. All errors are our responsibility. Abstract How much economic value did the diffusion of broadband create? We provide benchmark estimates for 1999 to 2006. We observe $39 billion of total revenue in Internet access in 2006, with broadband accounting for $28 billion(More)
We show that healthcare providers face a tradeoff between increasing the number of patients they treat and improving their quality of care. To measure the magnitude of this quality-quantity tradeoff, we estimate a model of dialysis provision that explicitly incorporates a center's unobservable and endogenous choice of treatment quality while allowing for(More)
This study addresses the need to account for unobserved heterogeneity in auctions in order to improve our estimates of the distribution of bidder values. Though the empirical auction literature is vast, few studies allow for there to be differences in the objects being auctioned which are unobservable to the researcher. The method presented in this paper(More)
We show that social interaction reduces the diversity of products purchased by consumers in two retail settings. First, we consider a field experiment conducted by Sweden's monopoly alcohol retailer and find that moving purchases from behind the counter to self-service disproportionately increases the sales of difficult-to-pronounce products. Second, we use(More)
Game-theoretic models are frequently employed to study strategic interaction between agents. Empirical research has focused on estimating payoff functions while maintaining strong assumptions regarding the information structure of the game. I show how to relax informational assumptions to enhance the credibility of empirical analysis in discrete games. I(More)
This paper considers a simple model of a firm's name choice. A main prediction of the model, that the content of a firm's name will be correlated with its service quality under certain conditions, belies the intuition that a firm's freely chosen name will represent only " cheap talk " about itself. Using unique data from markets for residential plumbing(More)
We consider the relationship between market structure and health outcomes in a setting where patients have stark preferences: urology patients disproportionately match with a urologist of the same gender. In the United States, however, fewer than 6% of urologists are women despite women constituting 30% of patients. We explain a portion of this disparity(More)
We exploit a nonlinear reduction in a bank's check-cashing fees to identify the elasticity of demand for check cashing across two policy-relevant margins. First, we find that consumers are nearly two and a half times more responsive to changes in price than travel costs. Second, we find that an extra day of check-clearing time makes an account holder 15.5%(More)
Medicare's prospective payment system for long-term care hospitals (LTCHs) gives providers modest per-diem reimbursements for short patient stays before jumping discon-tinuously to a large lump-sum payment after a specified number of days. Using Medicare claims data, we show that LTCHs strategically discharge patients after they exceed the large-payment(More)